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Abstract
My thesis consists of three chapters relating to the economics of digital
piracy. Digital piracy is a debated topic catching tremendous academic and
public attention. My studies contribute to the understanding of the impact of
digital piracy on legitimate sales revenue with a focus on the motion picture
industry.
In my first chapter, I examine the effects of screener piracy on the movie
box office. Screeners are movie copies sent to critics and industry professionals
for evaluation purposes. Sometimes, screeners are leaked and made available
to download on the Internet. This chapter exploits the plausibly exogenous
variation of file sharing/piracy activities caused by screener leaks of Oscar-
nominated movies to estimate the impact of movie piracy on box office revenue.
Using information on leak dates collected from thepiratebay.org, I compare the
box office performance of leaked and non-leaked movies both cross-sectionally
and employing a difference-in-difference strategy to identify the causal effect
of piracy on movie box office. I find evidence that screener piracy reduces
the box office revenue of the leaked movie in subsequent weeks. However, the
negative impact depends on the timing of leaks. Damages to the total box office
for movies with late leaks are much smaller compared to pre-release screener
leaks.
One reason behind the lack of consensus regarding the impact of piracy in
the empirical literature is the dearth of data on actual piracy activity. Data limi-
tation restricts most empirical researchers to reduced-form and quasi-experimental
methods, where estimates on industry loss may be biased due to extrapolation
of the local average treatment effects to the population. To deal with the data
challenge, in the next two chapters I have collected a dataset of weekly ille-
gal downloads on BitTorrent in the United States from 40,267 torrent files for
255 movies released between March 27th and December 27th, 2015. Being
able to directly observe piracy activities, my studies avoid many issues such as
measurement error or sample selections which exist in studies using proxies or
conjoint surveys.
In my second chapter, I utilize this novel dataset of illegal movie downloads
to estimate a random-coefficient demand model of movie consumption. Using
counterfactual experiments, I quantify the effects of piracy on movie box office
ii
revenue. The model distinguishes two channels of piracy substitution effects:
(1) intra-movie substitution effects, which are the focus of most previous lit-
erature; and (2) inter-movie substitution effects, which represent the spillover
of one title’s piracy to the other titles’ revenue. While the latter channel has
been rarely explored in the literature due to restrictions imposed by data and
methods, the novel dataset and demand model allow me to quantify its relative
impact. I find that the revenue loss due to piracy’s inter-movie substitution is
on average 4 times as large as the intra-movie substitution effects. Omitting
inter-movie substitution severely underestimates the actual damage of piracy.
Other counterfactuals show that piracy reduces the total box office revenue of
the motion picture industry by $93 million in total, 1.09% of the current box
office.
In my third chapter, I extend the result of my second chapter by considering
heterogeneity in the effects of piracy. Based on the data and methodology em-
ployed in the second chapter, I utilize information on video quality of illegal
files to separate piracy by video quality. Augmented by data on home-video
sales, I quantify the heterogeneous effects of piracy by distributional chan-
nels and video quality. In addition, a heatedly debated topic on digital piracy
is about the potential positive effects of piracy due to channels like word-of-
mouth. I incorporate the word-of-mouth effects of piracy in my model and
quantify the contribution of piracy’s word-of-mouth on movie sales revenue. I
find that piracy’s effects are large on the home-video market and small on the
theatrical market. For high-quality piracy, substitution effects dominate word-
of-mouth effects. For low-quality piracy, substitution effects are dominated by
word-of-mouth effects which make low-quality piracy a potential promotional
tool for studios.
Keywords: Industrial Organization, Digital Piracy, Intellectual Property
Rights, Word-of-mouth, File-sharing, Motion Picture Industry
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Summary for Lay Audience
Nowadays, technology like file-sharing makes it very easy to get illegal
copyrighted content on the Internet. The digital piracy problem has attracted a
great deal of public attention. There are concerns that digital piracy might kill
the creative content industry. My thesis examines the impact of digital piracy
on legitimate sales revenue using data on the motion picture industry.
I find that the effects of piracy are more complicated than we used to be-
lieve. First, I find that screener piracy accidents reduced leaked movies’ box-
office. The effects are more pronounced for pre-release leaks. Second, using
actual downloads data on movies, I find that piracy of one movie also nega-
tively affects the revenues of other movies in theaters at the same time. Third,
I find that the negative effects of piracy depend on a lot of factors. Physical
home-video market revenues are heavily affected by piracy, but the negative
effects on theatrical market revenue are very small. High-quality piracy with
high resolution is mainly responsible for the lost sales, while low-quality piracy
can be used as a promotional tool if we consider the word-of-mouth produced
by pirates. In the end, the results suggest that the effects of piracy are very
different. The conclusion we draw regarding piracy in one industry may not be
easily extended to the others. Public policy on digital piracy should be cautious
about over-generalizing evidence from other industries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the very important developments on the Internet is the emergence of
peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing. In less than 20 years, P2P file-sharing has ex-
perienced dramatic growth and has become one of the most common activities
on the Internet. The most widely used file-sharing protocol, BitTorrent, now
has more than 170 million active users worldwide. It is claimed that BitTor-
rent moves as much as 40% of the world’s Internet traffic on a daily basis.1
The wide use of file-sharing has provided Internet users free and easy access to
unauthorized copies of digital content such as movies and music, resulting in a
surge in digital piracy.2
These facts have raised concerns among both policy makers and academic
researchers about the economic effects of file-sharing on relevant industries.
However, there is yet no consensus on the impact of file-sharing. Many peo-
ple, especially copyright holders in the movie and music industries, treat file-
sharing as the major reason for declining sales. Several widely quoted industry
investigations have indicated evidence of huge economic losses, for example,
software piracy cost the U.S. economy about 63.4 billion dollars in 2011 (Busi-
ness Software Alliance’s [BSA’s] 2011 Piracy Study). Digital piracy causes 58
billion dollars in actual U.S. economic losses and 373,000 lost jobs (IPI 2005
study)3. However, the reliability of some of these estimates is under criticism
1BitTorrent Inc: http://www.bittorrent.com/company/about
2http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/08/riaa-says-bittorrent-software-accounts-for-75-of-piracy-
demands-action/
3http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/58-billion-in-economic-damage-and-373000-jobs-lost-in-us-
due-to-copyright-piracy-58354582.html
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for the unrealistic assumptions made in these studies.4 This relatively “naive”
methodology inevitably inflates the estimated loss. A reliable quantification of
the damage caused by piracy is therefore valuable for understanding the po-
tential impact of piracy, and for resolving the current debate on intellectual
property.
My thesis consists of three chapters relating to the economics of digital
piracy. Digital piracy is a debated topic attracting tremendous academic and
public attention. My studies contribute to the understanding of the impact of
digital piracy on legitimate sales revenue with a focus on the motion picture
industry.
In my first chapter, I examine the effects of screener piracy on the movie
box office. Screeners are movie copies sent to critics and industry professionals
for evaluation purposes. Sometimes, screeners are leaked and made available
for download on the Internet. This chapter exploits the plausibly exogenous
variation of file-sharing/piracy activities caused by screener leaks of Oscar-
nominated movies to estimate the impact of movie piracy on box office revenue.
Using information on leak dates collected from thepiratebay.org, I compare the
box office performance of leaked and non-leaked movies both cross-sectionally
and employ a difference-in-difference strategy to identify the causal effect of
piracy on movie box office revenue. I find evidence that screener piracy reduces
the box office revenue of the leaked movie in subsequent weeks. However, the
negative impact depends on the timing of leaks. Damages to the total box office
revenue for movies with late leaks are much smaller compared to pre-release
screener leaks.
One reason behind the lack of consensus regarding the impact of piracy
in the empirical literature is the dearth of data on actual piracy activity. The
data limitation restricts most empirical researchers to reduced-form and quasi-
experimental methods, where estimates on industry loss may be biased due to
extrapolation of the local average treatment effects to the population. To deal
with the data challenge, in the next two chapters I have collected a dataset of
weekly illegal downloads on BitTorrent in the United States from 40,267 tor-
rent files for 255 movies released between March 27 and December 27, 2015.
Being able to directly observe piracy activities, my studies avoid many issues
4For instance BSA admits that they assume that every download counts as one lost sale in their study
3such as measurement error or sample selection that exist in studies using prox-
ies or conjoint surveys.
In my second chapter, I utilize this novel dataset of illegal movie downloads
to estimate a random-coefficient demand model of movie consumption. Using
counterfactual experiments, I quantify the effects of piracy on movie box office
revenue. The model distinguishes two channels of piracy substitution effects:
(1) intra-movie substitution effects, which are the exclusive focus of the pre-
vious literature, and (2) inter-movie substitution effects, which represent the
spillover of one title’s piracy to the other titles’ revenue. The latter channel
has rarely been explored in the literature because of restrictions imposed by
data and methods, but the novel dataset and demand model used in my study
allowed me to quantify its relative impact. I found that the revenue loss due to
piracy’s inter-movie substitution is on average four times as large as the intra-
movie substitution effects. Omitting inter-movie substitution would severely
underestimate the actual damage caused by piracy. Other counterfactuals show
that piracy reduces the total revenue of the motion picture industry from box
office sales by $ 93 million in total, 1.09 % of the current box office revenue.
In my third chapter, I extend the result of my second chapter by considering
heterogeneity in the effects of piracy. Based on the data and methodology em-
ployed in the second chapter, I utilize information on the video quality of ille-
gal files to separate piracy by video quality. Augmented by data on home-video
sales, I quantify the heterogeneous effects of piracy by distributional channels
and video quality. In addition, I consider the potential positive effects of piracy
due to channels like word-of-mouth (WOM), apossibility that has been the sub-
ject of much debate. I incorporate the WOM effects of piracy in my model and
quantify the contribution of piracy’s WOM effects on movie sales revenue. I
find that piracy’s effects are large on the home-video market and small on the
theatrical market. For high-quality piracy, substitution effects dominate WOM
effects. For low-quality piracy, substitution effects are dominated by WOM ef-
fects, which makes low-quality piracy a potential promotional tool for studios.
Chapter 2
Will the Leak Sink the Ship?
Screener Leaks and the
Impact of Movie Piracy
2.1 Introduction
The Christmas season of 2016 was not as sweet as it used to be for Hollywood
movie-makers. On 20 December 2016, Hollywood was shocked to find that
high-quality pirated versions of two blockbuster movies—The Hateful Eight
and The Revenant—had been leaked to the BitTorrent network, joining an un-
precedented long list of leaks that week, including Creed, Legend, In the Heart
of the Sea, Joy, Steve Jobs, Concussion and Spotlight. Many rate this unprece-
dented week of leaks as the worst incidence of piracy leaks in Hollywood his-
tory.
The end of December is a special time for movie pirates because of screener
piracy. Screeners are movie copies that are sent to movie critics and reviewers
for awards consideration. Screener piracy involves pirated videos ripped from
screeners and are of similar quality to videos ripped from media such as DVDs
(digital video discs) or online streaming websites. Screener piracy is a concern
to studios mainly because some appear relatively early in the theatrical run and
have better video quality than the other early low-quality CAM (camcorder)
piracy, which is mostly from boot-leg recordings in theatre.
4
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Hollywood studios have taken serious precautionary efforts to prevent screener
leaks. Firstly, in addition to the industry code of conduct and reputation which
indirectly discipline the reviewers, screeners are also watermarked with the
name of reviewing person or parties, so that the leaking person or parties can
be traced and are held accountable. Secondly, most screeners DVD are pro-
tected by encryption which prohibits illegal copying. However, all of these
safeguards don’t guarantee perfect protections. Pirates sometimes managed to
obtain screeners from “internal contacts” in the reviewing parties, and success-
fully decrypted the digital protection.
Despite their substantial efforts, bad luck does still strike. Every year, a
few “unlucky” DVD screeners are leaked and then flood the Internet. While
these leaks might be mishaps to the movie industry, the potential randomness
of these events provide a great opportunity to investigate the role of piracy on
movie sales. To date, whether and to what degree piracy hurts revenue is still
a hotly debated empirical question. On the one hand, since the invention of
Napster, a first-generation file-sharing tool, music record sales have declined
dramatically, naturally suggesting that file sharing or piracy activities are the
primary suspect for such a dramatic decline. On the other hand, however, other
confounding factors, such as the change in digital distribution channels and the
emergence of other means of digital entertainment, which happened roughly
at the same time as the surge of digital piracy and file sharing, make the issue
more complicated.
One of the challenges in identifying the effect of digital piracy on the sales
revenue of digital content is the endogeneity of piracy downloads, as both ille-
gal downloads and sales are strongly correlated with unobservable movie char-
acteristics. Better movies naturally attract more pirates and have higher piracy
downloads. The selection problem would result in substantial positive bias,
masking the true effect of piracy in an OLS regression.
This chapter explores the impact of movie piracy on box office revenue us-
ing the exogenous variation in piracy activities caused by screener leak shocks.
The identification builds on the possible orthogonality between screener leaks
and the movie’s unobservable quality. Using a dataset of leak dates for Holly-
wood movies released between 2003 and 2016 obtained from thepiratebay.org,
and a dataset including each movie’s weekly and total box office revenue from
boxofficemojo, I explored the relationship between screener piracy and industry
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box office revenue.
The study in this chapter finds several interesting results. First, difference-
in-difference estimates indicate that screener piracy leaks reduce the subse-
quent box office revenue of affected movies by 29.8% on average. Second,
the negative effect depends on the timing of leaks. Cross-sectional analysis
shows that on average movies with pre-release leaks under-perform in box of-
fice revenue by 3.2 million dollars. However, damages to the total box office
revenue for movies with late leaks are more moderate and statistically insignif-
icant compared to pre-release screener leaks. Generally damage from piracy
decreases in leak time.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
relevant literature. Section 1.3 discusses the data and background. Section
1.4 presents preliminary pre-analysis checks. Section 1.5 discusses results of
the cross-sectional analysis. Section 1.6 describes the alternative difference-in-
difference analysis and results. Section 1.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This chapter adds to a large body of literature that focuses on the effect of
piracy/file-sharing on sales of digital products. Overcoming the potential en-
dogeneity problem of piracy is a challenging task in the empirical literature on
piracy/file-sharing. Better movies naturally attract more pirates and are asso-
ciated with more piracy activities. This selection problem contributes to sub-
stantial positive bias that could mask the true effect in an OLS regression. One
of the earliest studies was Liebowitz (2004) who assessed various possible ex-
planations for the recent decline in music sales and found that MP3 downloads
do harm music sales because alternative reasons could not explain the observed
reduction in sales.
Using panel data on aggregate music sales by country and individual-level
cross-section data, Zentner (2006) studied the effect of music downloads on
music purchases. Using the number of broadband Internet users as measures of
file-sharing activities, and using degrees of Internet sophistication and Internet
speed as instruments, he found that file sharing reduced an individual’s prob-
ability of music purchase by an average of 30%. Based on his estimates, he
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concluded that without file sharing, music sales in 2002 would have increased
by 7.8%.
Rob and Waldfogel (2004) studied the same topic using survey micro data
of 412 U.S. college students and their album purchase information. After in-
strumenting for downloads using access to broadband connection, they found
that each download reduced purchases by about 0.2 in their sample. Their wel-
fare analysis showed that file-sharing significantly increased consumer welfare
and the reduction of deadweight loss due to file-sharing doubled the loss of
producer profits.
In another paper, Danaher and Waldfogel (2012) studied the relationship
between international release gaps and box office revenues. They find that
longer release windows are associated with decreased box office returns, even
after controlling for film and country fixed effects. In addition, the effect is
much stronger after adoption of BitTorrent and in heavily-pirated genres.
However, another study by Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) found op-
posite results. They collected data on weekly album sales and weekly down-
loads of albums on Napster. Using international school holidays as instruments,
their results show that the effect of file sharing on album sales is statistically
indistinguishable from 0.
Ma et al. (2014) studied pre-release movie piracy and found that pre-release
piracy caused a 19.1% decrease in revenue compared with piracy that occurred
post-release. In a related paper, Lu et al. (2019) studied the substitution and
WOM effects of piracy. They find that substitution effects dominate WOM
effects for pre-release piracy and WOM effects dominate substitution effects
for post-release piracy. While Ma et al. (2014) and Lu et al. (2019) do not
emphasize the quality differentiation of movie piracy, I focus on the impact
of high-quality piracy resulting from screener leaks. In addition, piracy avail-
ability is correlated with many endogenous factors, such as the international
release gap; focusing on screener leaks provides cleaner identification because
screener release is determined by the timing of film festivals and is less depen-
dent on movie quality.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 Data Collection
Two datasets were employed in this paper. First, data on both weekly and total
movie box office for 9,799 movies released from 2003 to 2016 were collected
from the box office reporting website BoxofficeMojo.com. For each movie I
also collected associated characteristics including genre, Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America (MPAA) rating, studio, movie runtime, and budget from the
International Movie Database (IMDB). Movie rating data were obtained from
Rottentomatoes, which took integer values from 1 to 100. I also collected in-
formation about film award wins and nominations for each movie from IMDB,
particularly awards and nominations with respect to the Academy Awards (Os-
cars). Some time-varying variables, including opening screens, and total num-
ber of screens, were also collected from BoxofficeMojo.com.
The second dataset consisted of the dates of screener leaks for each Oscar
nominee. The data were collected by scraping the piracy search engine thepi-
ratebay.org. I choose thepiratebay.org because it was one of the most popular
torrent sites in 20171, the website has a long history going back to 2003, which
allowed me to trace historic leaks of earlier movies.2 To collect the data on
screener leaks, for each Oscar nominees between 2003 and 2016, I searched
on thepiratebay.org with keywords including combinations of the movie name
with one of three identifying keywords: “screnner”, “dvdscr”, “scr”.3 I used
an automated script to extract search results for each query. thepiratebay.org
provides upload date for each torrent file in the search result, which allowed
me to track the earliest date of piracy. For each movie I took the earliest upload
date in the search result as the leak date of its screener.4
1https://torrentfreak.com/top-10-most-popular-torrent-sites-of-2017-170107/
2Although its service did get interrupted several times in history because of legal issues, the database is not
affected so previous information before interruptions is still available.
3These keywords are the most common screener format indicators in a torrent file name.
4Baio (2016) also collect statistics on leaks date for Osacar nominees, I find the leak date collected from
thepiratebay.org to be different from Baio (2016) for a significant fraction of movies. For movies with different
leak dates in the two data, I take the earlier one. In addition, data of movie theatrical release dates in US are
collected from BoxofficeMojo.com. Public data on screener release date (the date when screeners are sent to
critics) is difficult to find. Following Baio (2016), I first used screener receipt dates reported by movie critic Ken
Rudolph from his personal website (http://kenru.net/movies/) as the screener release date. The website records
the date every movie screener was received by the critic from 2001 to 2017. I also used the earliest reviews posted
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2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 shows how the number of leaks changed over time. From the table,
screener leaks in BitTorrent exhibit significant time series variations. A higher
level of leaks is observed during the period from 2003 to 2009, with on average
3.7 movies having screener leaks before or during the first week of release. For
those leaked movies, the average time between the U.S. release date and the
average leak date was above 50 days. After 2009, the pre-release leaks hap-
pened less frequently, averaging 1 movie every year during the period 2010 to
2015. The average leak-release gap, however, has shrunk from about 50 days to
38 days. The incidence of leaks showed large variations over the years, which
demonstrates the underlying randomness governing the success of obtaining
screeners by pirates. In 2016, the number exploded because of the number of
leaks by the group HIVE-CM8 mentioned earlier 5. A large number of movies
was leaked during their theatrical runs in December, six movies were leaked
before their scheduled release dates and two movies during the first week after
release.
I first compare total box office of Oscar nominees over the year with the
intensity of leaks every year, using the measures mentioned in Table 2.1. Figure
2.1 plot the evolution of yearly aggregate box office of all Oscar nominees and
two measures of intensity of screener leaks: number of movies leaked before or
during first week of release, and the average days between US theatrical release
to leaks. The time series patterns show that there is significant correlation
between box-office performance and leaks: box-office tends to be lower if there
are fewer leaks, and box-office are higher if on average leaks happen at later
time. The correlation suggests potential links between screener piracy activities
and theatrical market performances.
I first compared total box office revenue of Oscar nominees with the inten-
sity of leaks for each year, using the measures mentioned in Table 2.1. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows the evolution of yearly aggregate box office revenue of all Os-
car nominees and two measures of intensity of screener leaks: the number of
movies leaked before or during the first week of release, and the average num-
in IMDB as an alternative check—for movies with different release dates in the two sets of data, I took the earlier
one as the release date.
5Source: https://www.theverge.com/2015/12/24/10663146/hollywood-s-christmas-is-being-ruined-by-
unprecedented-leaks
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Figure 2.1: Pattern of Correlation between Box office and Leaks over Time
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Table 2.1: Time Trend of Screener Leaks
Average Time between Number of movies Number of movies
Year US release date leaked on or before leaked before
and Screener leak date first week in theatre release date
2003 44.88 3 2
2004 31.125 8 6
2005 57.1538 2 2
2006 51.5417 2 2
2007 43.2333 4 2
2008 55.9412 3 2
2009 57.5 4 1
2010 25.2222 2 2
2011 51.6667 1 1
2012 36 1 1
2013 45.9412 1 1
2014 43.7143 0 0
2015 28.1538 2 2
2016 30.9444 8 6
ber of days between U.S. release and leaks. The time series patterns show that
there is significant correlation between box office performance and leaks: box
office revenue tends to be lower if there are fewer leaks and box office higher if
on average leaks happen later. The correlation suggests potential links between
screener piracy activities and theatrical market performance.
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for four sets of samples. As a reference
group, column (1) shows descriptive statistics for all movies released in the
United States theatrical market during 2003 to 2016. There are 9,799 movies
in the whole sample. On average one movie yields box office revenue of about
16.9 million dollars, with a huge dispersion represented by the standard devia-
tion of 47.88 million. Similar dispersions exist among other variables such as
the number of screens, first week box office. Budget data are only available for
around 2,000 movies. Of those available, the average budget is 56.39 million
dollars, with standard deviation of 82.75 million. About 4.55% of all movies
are nominated for the Academy Award.
In this chapter, I focus on the sample of Academy Award (Oscar) nomi-
nees6. The subsample of Oscar nominees represents 4.5% of the total sam-
6Here I include Oscar nominees for all award categories except short film (live action).
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ple. As there is huge heterogeneity in movies, restricting the sample to Oscar
nominees made the sample more comparable in terms of quality and market
reception, reducing the potential endogeneity due to unobserved quality. The
summary statistics are presented in column (2) of the table. Clearly Oscar
nominees have more box office appeal because of the better quality, with aver-
age total box office revenue increase from 16.9 million dollars to 93.2 million
dollars. These movies also invest more in budget (83.45 million dollars com-
pared with 56.39 million dollars) and are assigned to more opening screens by
theatres (2,019 compared with 718). If we look at the distribution of genres,
drama and science fiction movies are overrepresented in the sample of Oscar
nominees—their shares rise from 22.7% and 2.1% to 41.0% and 5.8%, respec-
tively. Leaks happen in about 60% of the Oscar nominees, and about 11% of
leaks happen prior to theatrical releases.
Column (3) reports summary statistics for the leaked Oscar movies and col-
umn (4) reports statistics for the non-leaked movies. To compare the observable
movie characteristics for leaked and non-leaked movies, I conducted a balance
test, discussed in the next section.
2.4 Pre-analysis Checks
Before proceeding to the main empirical analysis, I first conducted several
tests on the exogeneity of leaks. A natural way to analyse my research ques-
tion is to directly compare box office revenue between leaked and non-leaked
movies—the underlying identification assumption is that leaks are independent
of other movie-specific, unobservable confounding factors that also relate to
box office revenue. The result of a cross-sectional comparison of box-office
performance will be biased by any movie-specific unobservable factors affect-
ing both demand and leaks. For example, it might be the case that leaks are
affected by unobservable movie demand shocks. Movie pirates target the most
popular movies, hence movies with higher box office appeal are more likely to
suffer from leaks7. It is therefore important to check the validity of my identi-
fication assumption. Although there is no conclusive test of the identification
7As discussed in the Empirical Strategy section, the difference-in-difference specification is immune to this
case as any time-invariant difference would be taken care of using movie fixed effects. However, this case would
bias any cross-sectional result as it is impossible to include movie fixed effects.
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assumption, I can exploit the richness of my data to present some evidence
supporting the exogeneity of screener leaks incidence.
2.4.1 Balance Test
To address these potential concerns, I did a balance test for observable char-
acteristics between the leaked and unleaked samples. For each characteristic,
I ran a t-test for equality of group means on major observable characteristics.
The t-statistics are reported in Table 2.3. We would expect small t-statistics
across most observables if the two samples are relatively homogeneous. Based
on the result, for the most important variables, the mean of rating between
two samples were not significantly different. For example, two samples had
very similar ratings, with 79.42 for leaked movies and 78.31 for unleaked
movies. On average, leaked movies and unleaked movies have similar number
of screens at peak time (2,014 versus 2,028). As the total number of screens
is strategically adjusted according to change in demand, this indicates that ex
post market reception is similar for leaked and unleaked movies. In terms of
scheduled screens during the first week, however, I did observe a significant
difference: unleaked movies have more screens than leaked ones. The differ-
ence resulted from a higher number of leaked movies choosing limited release
initially8, which indicates that unleaked movies are expected to perform bet-
ter in market ex ante. The results also show that for genres such as action,
comedy, horror, and romance there is no significant difference between the two
groups. However, I did observe that genres such as drama and crime are over-
represented in the leaked group so it is important to control for them in the
cross-section regression.
I then switched to comparisons between movies with pre-release leaks and
other movies. There are 30 movies with pre-release leaks, making the sample
size of the treatment group to be much smaller than the control group. The
differences in most covariates are more pronounced—movies with pre-release
leaks tend to have smaller release, with fewer opening screens scheduled and
fewer screens at peak. The difference in genre distribution is less significant.
Similar to the previous result, drama movies are over-represented in the treat-
8Limited-released movies usually are first released in theatres in major metropolitan areas such as New York
and Los Angeles. After gauging their market appeal, some movies will then be released nationwide.
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Table 2.3: Test of Baseline Balance
Treatment: Screener Leaks Treatment: Screener Leaks before Theatrical Release
Treatment Control Control-Treatment (t-statistics) Treatment Control Control-Treatment (t-statistics)
t-tests Between Group Means
Key Covariates
Rating 79.42 78.31 -1.12 (-0.63) 81.37 78.81 -2.56 (-0.75)
Number of Screens at Peak 2014.28 2028.34 14.06 (0.10) 1090.37 2086.93 996.56∗∗∗ (3.76)
Scheduled screens for first week 1309.15 1703.31 394.16∗ (2.44) 345.37 1546.55 1201.19∗∗∗ (3.84)
Budget 77.79 93.46 15.67 (1.49) 46.16 85.83 39.68 (1.88)
Genres
Action 0.06 0.11 0.05 (1.81) 0.03 0.08 0.05 (0.95)
Drama 0.46 0.32 -0.14∗∗∗ (-2.97) 0.60 0.40 -0.20∗ (-2.19)
Animation 0.09 0.19 0.10∗∗∗ (3.16) 0.03 0.14 0.11 (1.68)
Comedy 0.14 0.09 -0.46 (-1.46) 0.10 0.13 0.03 (0.40)
Crime 0.05 0.01 -0.04∗∗ (-2.69) 0.03 0.03 0.00 (0.01)
Horror/Thriller 0.09 0.08 -0.01 (-0.19) 0.17 0.08 -0.08 (-1.59)
Romance 0.02 0.03 0.01 (0.37) 0.00 0.03 0.03 (0.90)
Science Fiction 0.04 0.09 0.05∗ (2.33) 0.03 0.06 0.03 (0.60)
Documentary 0.01 0.02 0.01 (0.92) 0.00 0.01 0.01 (0.60)
Observations 268 178 30 416
Joint Test of orthogonality
F-statistics: 1.15 1.72
Note: This table reports (1) the differences in mean variables and the corresponding t-statistics between the leaked and unleaked movies.
(2) Joint test of orthogonality is done by F-test on a linear regression of leak indicator variable as dependent variable and all the covariates
excluding market outcome variables as regressors.
ment group.
I also conducted a joint test of orthogonality to check if differences in key
covariates significantly influenced the assignment of treatment. I ran a linear
regression of the dummy variable of leaks as the dependent variable and all
the covariates excluding market outcome variables as regressors. The result of
the F-statistics is shown in Table 2.3. I can not reject the hypothesis that all
coefficients are 0.
2.5 Cross-sectional Evidence
Perhaps the most straightforward approach to this paper’s question regarding
the impact of piracy on legitimate movie revenue is to directly compare total
sales of leaked and unleaked movies. I therefore start with a cross-sectional
comparison using total box office revenue. I also exploit the timing of leaks by
comparing movies with early leaks and those with late leaks.
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2.5.1 Leaked vs. Non-leaked
First, I conduct a simple comparison of total box office revenue of leaked and
unleaked movies. One challenge is the comparability between leaked and un-
leaked groups. Although the balance test described in the previous section sug-
gested that observable differences between two samples are mostly insignif-
icant, it is still necessary to control for observable characteristics, especially
those that are significantly different. Additionally, sample heterogeneity is re-
duced by limiting the analysis to a more homogeneous sample, of only Oscar-
nominated movies. I use the following specification:
Yi = α + βLeaki + X′iγ +
2016∑
k=2003
λk1(RYi = k) +
11∑
j=1
τ j1(RMi = j) + i (2.1)
On the left-hand side, Leakit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the movie’s
screener is leaked during its run in theatres. Xit is a set of controls. As movie
fixed effects are unavailable, I add a rich set of controls, including the total
number of screens, the length of theatrical run, Rotten Tomatoes Rating, and
dummies for genre, MPAA rating, and major studios. RYi denotes the release
year of movie i, 1(RYi = k) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if movie i was
released in year k. k ranges from 2003 to 2016. Similarly, RMi denotes the
release month of movie i, 1(RMi = j) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if movie
i was released in month j ranging from 1 to 11.
For the dependent variable Yi, I used two sets of outcome variables: total
movie box office revenue and surprise sale. Following Moretti (2011), I used
the number of opening theatres as a proxy for expected demand and defined
the “suprise sale” of a movie as the residual demand that is not predicted by
the number of opening theaters and seasonality component (controlled for by
dummies for month and year). Specifically, for each movie i released at specific
time t, I regressed its opening screens OpenS creeni and release month and year
dummies on its box office Ri.
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Ri = α + βOpenS creeni +
2016∑
k=2003
λk1(RYi = k) +
11∑
j=1
τ j1(RMi = j) + i (2.2)
Let the model predicted box office revenue be Rˆi and define surprise sale as
the residual term:
S urprisei = Ri − Rˆi (2.3)
The constructed surprise sale essentially measures the ability of a movie to
outperform its market expectation. Under this specification, I treat the leaked
movies as the treatment group and unleaked movies as the control group and
test if the outcome variables is significantly different between these two groups.
If movie piracy indeed severely cannibalizes sales, I would expect the average
sale of leaked movies to be much lower than that of the unleaked movies, given
the assumption that screener leaks do not depend on unobservable heterogene-
ity that drives sales. In addition to the baseline specifications, I also try using
another definition of treatment: I define treatment as “Leaked prior to Release”,
which represent a more intense treatment.
The result of the cross-sectional regression is reported in Table 2.4. Column
(1) and (2) show the result using total box office revenue as the dependent
variable, and column (3) and (4) show the result using surprise sale as the
dependent variable. Beginning with the baseline comparison between leaked
and unleaked movies in column (1) and (3), I did not find strong evidence
that leaked movies perform worse than unleaked movies. The coefficient has a
negative sign; the magnitude indicates that on average leaked movies did worse
by $0.36 million for total box office revenue and $0.08 million for surprise sale.
The coefficients are of little statistical significance, however. The results are
not surprising as for a large fraction of leaked movies, leaks happen relatively
late in their theatrical runs. Because movie revenues are concentrated in the
beginning of the theatrical run, even if screener piracy causes severe harm to
subsequent box office revenue, the total impact can still be moderate if the
screener is leaked very late.
For further analysis, I switch to pre-release leaks as the treatment group.
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Table 2.4: Cross-sectional Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables: Total Box office Total Box office Surprise Sale Surprise Sale
Leaked -0.364 -0.081
(1.500) (1.506)
Leaked prior to Release -3.202∗ -2.993∗
(1.702) (1.640)
Total Number of Screens 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Length of Release (Days) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Rotten Tomatoes Rating 0.072∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Additional Controls
Genres Dummies X X X X
MPAA Rating Dummies X X X X
Major Studios Dummies X X X X
Calender Weak of Release Dummies X X X X
Year of Release Dummies X X X X
Observations 411 411 409 409
Adjusted R2 0.660 0.663 0.412 0.415
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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The results for total box office revenue and surprise sale are reported in column
(2) and (4), respectively. Once I restrict attention to a more intense treatment,
I find that the negative impact on box office becomes much higher in magni-
tude and statistically significant (p < 0.1). On average, movies with screeners
leaked prior to release did worse by $ 3.202 million for total box office revenue
and $ 2.99 million for surprise sale. In general the results reveal that the impact
of leaks is negative but lacks statistical significance. It also confirms that the
impact is more pronounced if leaks happen earlier, suggesting that the intensity
margin of leaks might be important as well.
2.5.2 Early Leaks vs. Late leaks
Inspired by the previous result, the second empirical test explores the impact of
leaks on the intensive margin. I utilize variations of the timing of leaks during
theatrical runs as the intensity of treatment. If leaks do harm sales, I would
observe that after controlling for quality, movies leaked earlier on average yield
lower box office revenue on average than movies leaked late.
For implementation, I constructed a variable LWi that denoted the number
of weeks between movie i’s U.S. release date and its screener leak date.
Noting that the marginal effect might vary depending on different treatment
levels, I dropped the uniform marginal effect assumption and transformed the
treatment variable into a series of dummies by different values of LWi .
Yi =
15∑
j=−4
β j1(LWi = m)+X′iγ+
2016∑
k=2003
λk1(RYi = k)+
11∑
j=1
τ j1(RMi = j)+i (2.4)
Here 1(LWi = m) is a set of dummies equal to 1 if the movie was leaked
in the mth week after release. The estimated coefficients of β j measures the
week-specific effect of a leak on movie outcome variable Yi.
Figure 2.2 reports the point estimates and 95% confidence interval on β j
the effects of leak timing on movie outcomes. Because I did not include an in-
tercept in the specification, the point estimate corresponding to each leak week
dummy can be treated as the average box office revenue in that leak week cate-
gory after controlling for release time and year. There was a significant upward
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Figure 2.2: Cross-Sectional Comparison: Effects of Leak Timing on Total Box-
office
trend in the early stage, especially before theatrical release. This was consis-
tent with the belief that early leaks before theatrical release attract a significant
number of consumers with high willingness-to-pay, especially when there is a
lack of legal channels for viewing the movie , and therefore the harm from pre-
release piracy should be the highest. For subsequent leaks after the theatrical
release, I find no compelling evidence of harm to box office revenue, as most
point estimates are statistically indistinguishable from the unleaked baseline.
This suggests that the harm to box office performance is significantly moder-
ated by the late occurrence of leaks. Because box office revenue for a movie is
not uniformly distributed over time in that a large fraction of box office revenue
comes from the first few weeks in the theatrical window, the harm from leaks
is expected to decrease in leak occurrence time.
2.6. Difference-in-Difference Analysis 21
2.6 Difference-in-Difference Analysis
2.6.1 Empirical Specifications
Complementary to the cross-sectional analysis, I adopt a difference-in-difference
(DD) strategy using weekly box office data. Unlike the cross-section analy-
sis, which hinges on the strong assumption that leaks are orthogonal to un-
observable heterogeneity, the difference-in-difference strategy relies on a much
weaker identification assumption of parallel pre-leak time trend between leaked
and unleaked movies, which also implies that the time-varying movie-specific
unobservable heterogeneity affecting sales is not correlated with screener leaks.
This study’s main identification strategy involved implementing a DD strat-
egy using panels of weekly box office data. Screener leaks incidence generates
substantial variations of piracy activity (downloads), both across movies and
across time. The DD strategy will explore these variations and estimate the im-
pact of piracy by comparing the change in ticket sales before and after screener
leaks for leaked movies against a baseline of changes in ticket sales of those
unleaked movies at the same calendar time and release time.9
The DD specification take the following forms:
ln(S aleit) = αLeakit + Xitβ +
∑
j
pi j1 {τit = j} + ξi + λt + εit (2.5)
On the left-hand side, the dependent variable is ln(S aleit) , the log of weekly
box office revenue for movie i at time t. On the right-hand side of the regression
I included movie fixed effects ξi, and calender time fixed effects λt. In addition,
because box office revenue has a natural exponential declining pattern, I need
to control for weeks after release. As such decline is in a non-linear fashion I
include a series of release week dummies
∑
j 1 {τit = j}where τit is the count of
weeks after theatrical release with j = 1, 2, ..., J. It works non-parametrically
to control the pattern. Leakit is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if movie
9The DD specification will take care of a majority part of concerns for selection as the following unobservable
factors are accounted for in the specification: (1) movie-specific time invariant unobservable heterogeneity (e.g.,
better movies attract more pirates and have more downloads); (2) general decreasing trend of box office revenue
over its release time (e.g., natural decaying patterns will not be falsely attributed to the effect of piracy); (3)
calendar time-variant but movie-invariant factors (e.g., box office revenue and downloads both increase when
summer holiday begins).
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i’s screener has already leaked at time t. εit is the idiosyncratic error term. I
clustered the standard error at the movie level, allowing for serial correlation
of error within movies.
The first difference is taken using the movie fixed effects, which address
time-invariant movie heterogeneity. The second difference is taken using the
time fixed effect, which take care of the general time trends that are movie-
invariant. The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the percentage changes
of box office revenues of movies after the emergence of screener piracy (β)
against the baseline change of movies without the presence of piracy. If the
estimated coefficient of β is significantly negative, it would be evidence that
piracy significantly cannibalizes sales.
2.6.2 Results
The results of the panel regressions using weekly data are reported in Table 2.5.
As a starting point I first present the simple OLS results at first two columns.
Column (1) shows estimates for the simplest OLS specification without fixed
effects. Not surprisingly, the estimates are small in magnitude (-0.028) and
insignificant as most of the upward bias due to endogeneity of movie quality
has not been corrected yet. As a first attempt to correct for endogeneity, I
proceed by including rating in the OLS regression as a control for quality. As
the result shows in column (2), once rating is added, the coefficient on leaks
becomes -0.135, which implies that occurrence of screener piracy decreases
the weekly box office revenue by 12.6%10 . In comparison to the previous OLS
estimates, it suggests that adding controls for quality help reduce a significant
amount of upward bias.
Now we turn to the DD estimates. In columns (3) and (4), I further add
movie fixed effects, calendar week fixed effects, and week of release fixed ef-
fects to control for additional sources of endogeneity, for reasons discussed in
the previous section. After differencing out the time-invariant movie-specific
component, the general seasonality component, and decaying pattern using
these three sets of fixed effects, the coefficient on leaks becomes -0.355 and
is much larger in magnitude compared with the OLS estimates. The compar-
10Interpretation of coefficient is calculated as (exp(−0.135) − 1) ∗ 100
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ison highlights again the importance of movie heterogeneity and time-varying
demand effects in influencing the estimate. The result in column (3) indicates
that the occurrence of screener piracy lowers weekly box office by 29.8%.
To test the identification assumption on the parallel pre-treatment trend, I
conduct a falsification test as in Autor (2003) by including leads and lags of
treatment in the DD specification.
Let Ti be time of leak for movie i; I estimated the following specification:
ln(S aleit) =
2∑
k=−2
αk1 {t = Ti + k} + Xitβ +
∑
j
pi j1 {τit = j} + ξi + λt + εit (2.6)
Here I included two leads and two lags of treatment effects, αk is the coeffi-
cient on the kth lag or lead. The falsification test essentially tests the hypothesis
that all coefficients of leads are 0: αk = 0 for k < 0. I employed the same set of
data and controls in the test and in the previous DD specifications.
I report the results of the falsification test in column (5). The coefficients of
all pre-treatment variables are statistically indistinguishable from 0, consistent
with the assumption of parallel time trend. All treatment effects after the leak
are of the same expected signs and are mostly statistically significant. I also
observe that the magnitude of the treatment effect at the leak (t = Ti) becomes
smaller after the inclusion of leads and lags, and higher for treatment effects
of 2 weeks lags (t = Ti+2). This observation suggests that treatment effects of
leaks to movie box office revenue accumulate and grow over subsequent weeks,
potentially due to the fact that more consumers have discovered the leak over
time.
2.6.3 Heterogeneous Effects by Rating
After the baseline specification, another natural question to ask is whether there
exists any effect heterogeneity, especially how the harm caused by screener
leaks differs by movie rating. Were good movies hurt more than bad movies or
the opposite? To examine the effect heterogeneity for rating, I added interac-
tion terms between leaks and rating. If heterogeneity is significant, we would
expect the coefficient to be statistically significant. As the result in column
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Table 2.5: OLS and Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Impact of Leaks on
Weekly Box Office
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS DD DD Falsification
Test
Leak -0.028 -0.135∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.119)
Leak × Rating 0.003∗
(0.001)
Rating 0.006∗∗∗
(0.000)
Log number of screens 1.065∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Falsification Test
Pre-Treatment (T-2) 0.016
(0.052)
Pre-Treatment (T-1) -0.008
(0.034)
Treatment (T) -0.086∗
(0.042)
Post-Treatment (T+1) -0.032
(0.039)
Post-Treatment (T+2) -0.115∗∗
(0.043)
Movie FE X X X
Calendar week FE X X X
Weeks since release dummies X X X
Observations 79454 73096 79454 73096 42320
Adjusted R2 0.867 0.875 0.865 0.871 0.905
Notes: The table provides the OLS and difference-in-difference estimates on the the effects of piracy on box office. The dependent
variable is the log of weekly box office of movie i. Column (1) reports the baseline estimates using OLS, column (2) adds rating
as control, column (3) reports the baseline difference-in-difference estimates. column (4) interacts Leaks with rating. Results of
falsification test is reported in column (5). All specifications include movie FE and calendar week FE. Standard errors in parentheses,
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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(4) shows, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive, although not very
precisely estimated (significant at 10% level). The estimate indicates sizable
effect heterogeneity for movie rating. For instance, a movie rated at 90 out of
100 will suffer from a drop of −(exp(−0.557 + 80 × 0.003) − 1) × 100 = 24.9
percent of sales at the box office in subsequent weeks after leaks, while a
hypothetical movie rated as low as 20 out of 100 will suffer from a drop of
−(exp(−0.557 + 20 × 0.003) − 1) × 100 = 39.1 percent of sales.
The result is consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature that
highlights the positive role of piracy from various channels including, for ex-
ample, sampling effect, network effect, and WOM effect (Liebowitz (1985),
Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006), Belleflamme and Peitz (2014), Peukert et al.
(2017),Lu et al. (2019)). It suggests that higher-rated movies better capital-
ize on the sampling feedback or positive WOM from piracy. The increase in
sales neutralizes piracy’s negative cannibalization, yielding a lower estimate of
negative effect as shown in the result.
2.7 Conclusion
There has been a long debate on the causal effect of piracy on revenues of digi-
tal content industries. The empirical difficulty for identification arises from the
confounding effect of unobservable demand factors affecting sales and down-
load simultaneously. In this study I used screener leaks as a natural experiment
for identification. Screeners are copies of movies sent to critics and industry
professionals for evaluation purposes. Sometimes screeners get leaked acci-
dentally and made available for download on the Internet. These incidences of
leaks provide a good opportunity for identifying the causal effects of piracy on
movie sales.
Using box office and screener leaks data of Oscar nominees from 2003 to
2016, I estimated the impact of movie piracy on box office revenue exploiting
the plausibly exogenous variation of piracy activities caused by screener leaks
of Oscar nominees. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest that screener
piracy caused by the leaks reduces leaked movies’ box office revenue in subse-
quent weeks by 29.8% on average. Although the magnitude is relatively large,
total revenue loss due to screener piracy might be much lower as the majority
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of screener piracy occurs at a late stage of theatre runs, piracy therefore only
affecting demand at the residuals. Second, evidence suggests that the effects
of leaks “spillover” to other, unleaked, movies. I found significant negative
indirect displacement effects among other movies: one additional contempora-
neous leak led to a 3% decrease of box office revenue of other unleaked movies.
The magnitude of the indirect displacement effect is stronger for movies that
are closer substitutes. The presence of indirect displacement implies negative
externalities of piracy. The total cost of an additional piracy leak will be higher
for the total industry revenue than for a particular leaked movie.
The result suggests that it is important to deter emergence of high-quality
piracy during the early stage of release because of their potentially detrimental
effects on sales. It should also be noted that piracy is of differentiated qual-
ity—the effects could be different by quality. As screener leaks are high-quality
piracy compared to the quality of common home video media, the implication
of this paper’s finding should be limited to the scope of high-quality piracy.
Chapter 3
Decomposing the
Intra-movie and Inter-movie
Substitution Effects of Movie
Piracy
3.1 Introduction
The empirical literature on digital piracy has focused on the magnitude of the
substitution effects of piracy on sales. One question that remained unanswered
is the source of substitution. Take the motion pictures industry as an example:
substitution on sales can come from either the piracy of the same movie title or
from piracy of different movie titles. A large body of the literature on movie
piracy has focused exclusively on the direct intra-movie substitution effect of
piracy, attempting to measure the response of one movie’s sales revenue to its
own piracy. How piracy of one movie affects other movies’ revenue is mostly
ignored in the literature.
Several features of the movie market suggest that the substitution pattern of
piracy might be quite complicated. First, the primary sources of high-quality
piracy usually come from ripping screener or physical home-video copies like
DVD or Blu-ray, and most downloads appear at the later stage of the theatri-
cal run, which accounts for a relatively small fraction of movie revenue. The
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lack of interaction in time weakens the intra-movie or direct substitution effect.
Second, fierce competition exists between similar movies. This competition
can arise due to constraint in consumers’ time, attention, and budget. There
is a great deal of evidence suggesting that similar movies with close release
windows significantly cannibalize each other’s sales (Einav, 2010, Dhar and
Weinberg, 2016). Such competition could also exist across channels. In real-
ity, piracy of a product may not only displace the revenue of its own legitimate
sales but also have a “spillover” effect on the revenue of the products that are
close substitutes.
Such spillover or inter-movie substitution effects of piracy are important to
our understanding and evaluation of piracy’s impact on the motion picture in-
dustry. Why do we care about the inter-movie substitution effect of piracy? The
presence of “spillovers” implies that the damage caused by a movie’s piracy
with regard to total industry revenue will be higher than the damage to its own
revenue. Research only measuring the direct intra-movie substitution effect
will potentially underestimate the total harm of piracy to the industry. Despite
their importance, these spillover effects have not yet been systematically quan-
tified in the literature.
The goal of this chapter is to answer these questions of interests. First, this
chapter quantifies the effect of piracy on movie box office revenue by estimating
a random coefficient demand model of movies using a novel dataset I collected
on actual downloads on BitTorrent. Second, using the estimated model, I de-
compose the inter-movie and intra-movie substitution effect by counterfactual
experiment.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows. First, for movies
released during a 40-week sampling period in 2015, I collect 40,267 relevant
movie torrent files via major torrent search engines. Using the collected tor-
rents, I construct a dataset of weekly movie downloads for movies in my sam-
pling period. Due to the lack of data on actual downloads, previous research
on file sharing has mainly explored various proxies and quasi-experiments on
piracy to study the effects of file sharing. Data limitations may hamper the
identification of the true effects of file sharing because of issues related to mea-
surement error and data representativeness. This chapter avoids these concerns
using direct information on downloads of pirated products.
Second, this chapter contributes to the empirical literature on movie piracy
3.1. Introduction 29
(Rob and Waldfogel, 2007; Smith and Telang, 2010; Danaher and Smith, 2014;
Danaher and Waldfogel, 2012; Peukert et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2019) by first
applying aggregate illegal download data on BitTorrent to estimate a random-
coefficient logit demand model for movie piracy. The use of a random-coefficient
demand models brings several benefits. (1) linear reduced-form estimations
employed in previous literature focus on exclusively intra-movie effect of piracy
(how movie A’s piracy affect its own revenue), while ignoring the inter-movie
substitution (how movie A’s piracy compete and cannibalize other movie’s rev-
enue).1 One advantage of logit demand models is that they naturally incor-
porate these competition effects between movies and therefore can be used to
study the inter-movie substitution effects of piracy. (2) As the reliability of
estimates of industry loss relies heavily on accurately identifying the true sub-
stitution patterns, random-coefficient logit demand models that allow for flexi-
ble substitution patterns will generate a more accurate estimate on the effects of
piracy compared with the multinomial logit models. The rich set of variation in
the choice set due to movie theatrical release and exit along with leaks of piracy
provides a sufficient source of variation for identification. (3) I can use coun-
terfactual experiments to test the efficacy of various anti-piracy policies. With
data on aggregate downloads, I can also quantify industry loss due to piracy,
which is difficult to obtain from reduced-form studies. The industry-wide loss
estimate based on the flexible demand model will be useful to test and improve
estimates from the previous widely cited industry studies. (4) Estimation of
a demand model allows the calculation of consumer welfare; therefore, I can
assess the welfare effect of file sharing and digital piracy.
This chapter’s findings are as follows. First, using the estimated demand
model, I decompose the intra-movie and inter-movie substitution effects of
piracy. I find that the revenue loss due to piracy’s inter-movie substitution
is on average 4 times as large as the intra-movie substitution. This is quite
surprising as it implies that considering only intra-movie substitution will seri-
ously underestimate piracy’s damage. Second, my damage estimates show that
piracy reduces the total box-office revenue of the motion pictures industry by $
93 million in total, 1.09% of the current box-office. The estimates are smaller
than widely cited industry estimates constantly referenced in policy making.
1It’s very difficult to incorporate competition effects using a linear reduced-form regression framework as it
requires including a full sets of each movies’ sales and piracy on the right-hand side of the equation.
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A “naive” methodology, which assumes full sale displacement of piracy, will
inflate the true cost of piracy by 13.6 times.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a
review of relevant literature. Section 3.3 provides background information on
the motion picture industry and file-sharing. Section 3.4 describes the data and
section 3.5 shows some preliminary evidence. Section 3.6 presents the model.
The estimation procedure and results are presented in Section 3.7. Section 3.8
gives the results of counterfactual experiments, and Section 3.9 concludes the
chapter.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper adds to several strands of literature. First, this paper is related to
the empirical literature on digital piracy and file sharing. Identifying the effects
of digital piracy on the sales of digital products is an empirically challeng-
ing question because of issues related to data limitations and the endogene-
ity of downloads. The displacement effects of file sharing on sales have been
widely studied in the literature. Generally researchers agree that piracy has a
nontrivial displacement effect on sales as the majority of papers find signifi-
cant negative effects on sales of both music (Liebowitz, 2004; Zentner, 2006;
Rob and Waldfogel, 2004; Hong, 2013) and movies (Danaher and Waldfogel,
2012; Rob and Waldfogel, 2007; De Vany and Walls, 2007; Bai and Waldfo-
gel, 2012; Ma et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2019), but the estimated magnitude of
the displacement effects differ substantially across papers. There are also a
number of papers finding moderate and insignificant negative effects, or even
positive effects (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007; Hammond, 2014; Aguiar
and Martens, 2016).
One reason behind the disparity of these empirical results is data limita-
tions. Due to the difficulty of observing actual downloads, researchers have
came up with different ways to overcome this empirical issue. Judging by
their methodologies, most research on file sharing can be classified into three
categories. First, many researchers employ various proxies, such as geographic
variation in the Internet penetration rate, broadband connection rate (Liebowitz,
2004, 2006; Zentner, 2006). Second, some papers take advantage of quasi-
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experiments, such as development of file sharing technology, the sudden close
of file sharing websites, or variation in international movie release windows
(Hong, 2013; Danaher and Waldfogel, 2012; Danaher and Smith, 2014; Peuk-
ert et al., 2017). Third, the many use survey data collected from groups of
consumers (Rob and Waldfogel, 2004, 2007; Bai and Waldfogel, 2012; Leung,
2015).
Each of these research methods has merits, but in absence of data on actual
file sharing activities, questions may arise, such as to what degree these proxies
and quasi-experiments can capture the true variation of file sharing activities,
and to what extent the consumers sampled in the survey are representative of
the true population. Having data on actual downloads can be a good comple-
ment to these studies. A few studies on music piracy have utilized actual file
sharing download data (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007; Hammond, 2014;
Aguiar and Martens, 2016). The data used in these studies include data on
Napster, data from private BitTorrent trackers, and clickstream data. Most of
them find no significant effect or a very moderate negative effect. The file shar-
ing data used in above-mentioned papers is exclusively about music piracy. In
comparison, I used file-sharing data on movies from a more recent period in
2015 in this paper. There are substantial differences between music piracy and
movie piracy: pirated MP3 music are generally of the same quality as legal
purchase, but there are significant differences in quality among movie piracy.
The sequential introduction of movies into different channels of sales (box of-
fice and DVD) and their effects on the availability of piracy make the issue
more complicated than music piracy. In addition, the landscape of file shar-
ing has changed dramatically, using data from more recent period is especially
more relevant in the context. Lastly, instead of using data from one tracker, I
attempt to estimate the aggregate download using data obtained from a more
comprehensive list of 84 popular public BitTorrent trackers.
Methodologically this paper is closely related to Leung (2013), who also
structurally estimated a random-coefficient logit model to study software piracy
using a conjoint survey of 281 college students. My papers are different in sev-
eral aspects. Leung (2015) studies the software industry, and this paper focuses
on the motion picture industry. While Leung (2013) focused on substitution
patterns under a single product setting, this paper instead focuses on estimat-
ing the total cost of piracy at the industry level, taking into considerations the
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substitution between different movie titles.
In addition to the empirical literature on file sharing, this paper is also re-
lated to the growing literature on the motion picture industry. Researchers have
studied different aspects of the motion picture industry, for example: movie
word-of-mouth (Chintagunta et al., 2010; Moul, 2007; Moretti, 2011; Gilchrist
and Sands, 2016b), seasonality in the motion picture industry (Einav, 2007),
uniform pricing practices (Orbach and Einav, 2007), estimation of price elas-
ticity (Davis, 2002; De Roos and McKenzie, 2014), vertical integration (Gil,
2008, Gil, 2010), effects of uncertainty in the movie industry (De Vany and
Walls, 1999; Elberse and Eliashberg, 2003), spatial competition in movie the-
atres (Davis, 2006), and strategic entry and exit decisions of studios and the-
atres (Einav, 2010; Takahashi, 2015; Dalton and Leung, 2017). This paper adds
to the literature on the effect of file sharing on the motion picture industry.
The third strand of related literature is the broad literature on intellectual
property, especially copyright. The emergence of file sharing may require gov-
ernments to adjust the existing strength of copyright protection accordingly.
However, there is no consensus on the optimal degree of intellectual property
protection. On the one side, as Boldrin and Levine (2002) point out, strong
property rights not only include the right to own and sell ideas but also the right
to regulate their use after sale, which will create a socially inefficient intellec-
tual monopoly. On the other side, Klein et al. (2002) argue that file-sharing
restricts the ability of copyright holders to exercise price discrimination and ef-
fectively control price, so file sharing services are likely to reduce the value of
copyrighted work. They argue that the use of strong property rights to restrict
piracy should be implemented even if there is a substantial cost of restricting
the consumer’s “fair use.” Empirical evidence on the effects of file sharing will
provide useful insight on the debate on optimal copyright protection.
3.3 Background: File sharing and BitTorrent
Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing is a decentralized file-transfer technology. In
traditional downloading methods, files are downloaded from centralized servers
which store the source file. Because of the limited bandwidth, download speed
deteriorates as the number of clients requesting services from the server in-
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creases. For P2P file sharing, clients download the file from other clients who
are also downloading the file or those who have already downloaded the file.
P2P file sharing efficiently utilizes the upload bandwidth of clients to facil-
itate downloading, therefore it successfully overcomes the bandwidth bottle-
neck of centralized servers and significantly increases download speed. Due to
these advantages, P2P file sharing has quickly gained popularity among Inter-
net users.
The history of file sharing dates back to 1999. An American computer
programmer named Shawn Fanning developed a peer-to-peer file sharing plat-
form called Napster. Napster was used to share music files among users and
it quickly became popular among Internet users. At its peak in 2001, Napster
had about 80 million registered users all over the world. In July 2001, Napster
was involved in a series of copyright lawsuits and was forced to shut down by
US court. After the shutdown of Napster, subsequent file sharing services have
been developed including Gnutella, Freenet, Kazaa, FastTrack, E-Mule, and so
on. Among those followers, BitTorrent has become the dominant file sharing
service, accounting for on average 40% of Internet upstream traffic according
to broadband management company Sandvine.2 Most files transfered in Bit-
Torrent are media files like movies, TV shows and music, and most of these
files are pirated. According to research conducted by RIAA, Bit Torrent may
account for about 70% of piracy activities around the world.
Due to the dominance of BitTorrent over other file sharing platforms, I fo-
cus on BitTorrent in the study of file sharing in this paper. As a dominant
protocol for file sharing and on-line piracy, BitTorrent is generally represen-
tative of the population of file-sharers and pirates. Although BitTorrent is not
the only P2P file sharing service, behavior of file-sharers are not systematically
different across different platforms (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007). Sec-
ond, even if there are difference across platform, BitTorrent is so dominating
nowadays that the share of other substitutes is negligible. According to the re-
search of Ipoque3, by 2011 the traffic of the second most popular file sharing
tool E-Donkey was only 2.6%. 4
2TorrentFreak: https://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-still-dominates-global-internet-traffic-101026/
3TorrentFreak, https://torrentfreak.com/p2p-traffic-still-booming-071128/
4In later years a significant fraction of piracy activities have shifted from BitTorrent to the use of on-line illegal
streaming service. Many popular illegal movie streaming websites such as Popcorntime is powered by BitTorrent
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3.4 Data
3.4.1 Data Description
In this paper, I combine data from several data sources. I assemble a dataset
including weekly information on movie-level box office sales, downloads, and
sales on DVD in the United States. I collected data covering a 40-week pe-
riod from March 27 to December 27 in 2015. The data contain weekly down-
loads on BitTorrent in the United States collected from 40,267 torrent files for
255 movies released between March 27 and December 27, 2015. The data
were collected using computer science techniques following several studies on
BitTorrent (Erman, 2005; Layton and Watters, 2010). The details of the data
collection method are presented in Appendix B.3.
The box office data were collected from box office reporting service website
Boxofficemojo.com. I collected information on weekly box office and movie
characteristics for all movies showing during the sampling period. I included
characteristics such as movie ratings, sequel, genres, MPAA rating (G/PG/PG-
13/R), and weeks after release, which are commonly used in studies on the
motion picture industry. Movie rating data were collected from Internet Movie
Database(imdb.com). Because the uniform pricing practice in movie theaters
and movie price data are hard to collect, only country-level average admission
price in the United States was obtained5. The box office revenues of some
independent movies are extremely small so that their market shares are indis-
tinguishable from zero. Inclusion of these “zero” market share movies would
introduce numerical problems to the estimation procedure so I dropped all ob-
servations with market share smaller than 0.01% in my sample.
I matched the box office data with the collected file-sharing data. Table 3.1
provides statistics about the top downloaded movies and top selling movies.
The top downloaded movies are generally blockbuster movies with big budgets
and massive advertising campaigns. Most best-seller movies also appear to be
and are therefore included in my data. Streaming through file-hosting service such as Openload is however not
included in my data. As a consequence, using only data on BitTorrent underestimates piracy activities.
5Admission price variation is very small. Although prices are different across screen
types(IMAX/3D/Ordinary), these variations are perfectly correlated with movie characteristics and there-
fore offer little identification power for the price elasticity. There is also price discrimination on different age
group and selected days in a week (e.g. Cheap Tuesday), but actual data on admission by type and price are hard
to obtain, so I did not attempt to estimate price elasticity in this study.
3.4. Data 35
Figure 3.1: file sharing Activities in the World
Notes: Darker colors denote higher numbers of file-sharers adjusted by country population. Frequency of file sharing activities in each country is based on a sample of 1,698,846 movie
downloaders’ IP addresses that I collected from public BitTorrent trackers during a 5 day period. The geographic information of IP addresses are obtained using Maxmind’s geoip database.
the most downloaded.
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3.1 shows the intensity of file sharing activities worldwide. The intensity
is measured by the number of file sharers I found in the sample period adjusted
by country population. File sharing is indeed penetrating almost every place in
the world. Out of 177 countries and regions in the study, file sharing activities
are found in 170 countries. In terms of the total number of file sharers, the
United States has the largest number of file sharers, comprising 13.7% of the
total number. Other followers include Russia (6.3%) and France (5.4%). Not
surprisingly, file sharing activities are positively correlated with the gross do-
mestic product (GDP) per capita and population size,6 but they are only mildly
correlated with Internet speed.7
Now I describe the summary statistics. Because of the panel structure of
my data, the basic observation is at the product-time level. For any movie there
are potentially two channels for a consumer to get access (theater/piracy). A
product is therefore defined as a movie and channel pair.
6The correlation coefficient between GDP and file sharing is 0.7649, and the correlation coefficient between
population and file sharing is 0.3262.
7The correlation coefficient between Internet speed and file sharing is 0.082. Due to data limitations I am only
able to collect the average Internet speed for 59 countries. Since most of the countries with low Internet speed are
not presented in the data, this selection problem may explain the low correlation found between Internet speed
and file sharing activities.
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Table 3.1: Top-sellers and top downloaded movies
Top Selling Movies
Title Admission(million)
Jurassic World 184.09
Furious 7 167.97
Avengers: Age of Ultron 155.83
Minions 120.15
The Hobbit: The Battle of the Five Armies 106.22
Inside Out 84.63
The Hunger Games: Mockingjay Part 1 83.57
Interstellar 75.00
Big Hero 6 73.09
Mission: Impossible - Rogue Nation 72.94
Top Downloaded Movies
Title Download(million)
Furious 7 35.85
Interstellar 35.08
Fifty Shades of Grey 30.54
Kingsman: The Secret Service 27.18
Big Hero 6 23.41
The Hobbit: The Battle of the Five Armies 21.65
American Sniper 21.28
Avengers: Age of Ultron 18.84
Taken 3 18.57
Jupiter Ascending 16.02
Notes: Box office and download data are up to September 11th, 2015. Box office and downloads are all global
numbers.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics on Movie Characteristics
Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Pirated .539 .498 0 1
Rating 6.426 1.554 4 9.3
Genre
Action .141 .348 0 1
Comedy .179 .384 0 1
Drama .219 .414 0 1
Horror .086 .281 0 1
Cartoon .066 .248 0 1
Foreign .043 .204 0 1
Science Fiction .061 .240 0 1
MPPA Rating
PG .160 .367 0 1
PG13 .347 .476 0 1
R .363 .481 0 1
Market Share
Sale( %) .077 .405
Illegal Downloads( %) .010 .020
Observations 6877
Note: The summary statistics are at product-time level. Rating are of a scale of 0-10. Pirated is
a dummy variable which equals 1 if the movie have pirated version available online. Sale and
Downloads in movie characteristics section are measured in units. Action, Animation, Com-
edy, Drama, Horror, Science Fiction, PG, PG13, R are all genre and MPAA Rating dummy
variables. In the market share section, the market share is an average of one movie’s market
shares in all weeks.
Table 4.4 provides sample descriptive statistics for the data at the products
level. About 54% of the products are pirated. The bottom panel of Table 4.4
provides information on the average product market shares by channels. The
average product market share of the ticket sales of a movie is about 0.077%,
piracy downloads on average take up 0.01% of market share. Taken together,
the illegal downloads account for less than 10% of all movie-watching activi-
ties. The three most common genres are drama (21.9%), comedy (17.9%), and
action (14.1%). Ratings on IMDB are on a scale of 0 to 10, the distribution of
rating has smaller dispersions, with an average of 6.43 and a standard deviation
of 1.56.
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3.5 Inter-Movie Substitution Effects of Piracy
As one kind of “experience” good, movies exhibit short product life cycles.
Consumers have strong preferences for new movies, and most advertising bud-
gets are spent in the first few weeks after the release date. Therefore, movie
sales concentrate at the beginning of the release. The common showing pe-
riod of a movie is about 6 to 10 weeks. For blockbuster movies, the box office
revenue of the opening week usually accounts for about 20% of the total box
office revenue. Figure 4.2 shows the pattern of the average weekly audience
(in millions) compared to other channels, including DVD sales and downloads
(in hundreds of thousands) by the number of weeks after the initial release.
Weekly audience attendance in the theatre decays exponentially, quickly drop-
ping to almost zero at around 10 weeks after the initial release date.
Downloads of pirated movies exhibit a very different pattern. They start
low and peak after around the 10th to 20th week after release, the trend is less
smooth partly because the new supply of better quality torrents in the later peri-
ods. Some important facts to highlight are that: (1) Qualitywise, early piracy is
hardly comparable to the legitimate theatrical product8. (2) For many movies, a
big part of their downloads happen at the end of the theatrical run, where avail-
ability of movie in theatres become limited. Figure 3.3 breaks total downloads
into three part: downloads during wide theatrical availability period (when stu-
dio arrange more than 1000 screens nationwide), downloads during limited
theatrical availability period (0-1000 screens) and downloads after theatrical
exit. The figure shows top 50 movies in terms of aggregate downloads.9 As
the figure shows, despite some heterogeneity in the composition, most movies’
downloads happen during the period with limited or no theatrical availability.
For many downloaders of piracy, illegal versions are the only options available
to them. Even if there were no piracy, the limited theatrical availability restrict
8During the first few weeks after release, most available pirated movies are the “CAM” version with very low
quality copy made in a cinema using a camcorder or mobile phone by audience, they are hardly comparable with
the quality of normal movies in theater. Around 5-10 weeks after release, many better quality “TC” version which
are usually copy produced by transfering the movie from its analog reel to digital format. pirated movies come
out and downloads start to increase. Download usually peaks at some time between 10-20 weeks after theater
release when the “DVDRip/BlurayRip” version pirated movies become available due to the movie’s DVD/Bluray
release. At this moment, movies’ theatrical windows have closed for a long time.
9To make it easy to compare, I restrict movies to have at least 40 weeks in theatre by the end of my sampling
period.
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copyright holder’s ability to recover their profits. It mitigates the potential harm
caused by intra-movie substitution.
Based on these facts, it is hard to believe that direct intra-movie substitution
by piracy is the only important source of damages to studio revenue. If com-
petition and substitution between titles are cross-channel and strong enough,
the data pattern suggests the possibility of sizable spillover or inter-movie sub-
stitution effects, which could even dominate the direct intra-movie substitution
effect. A simple decomposition might be useful to illustrate this point:
Let R be the industry revenue, which can be expressed as the sum of rev-
enues of all individual movies R j. The effect of movie j’s piracy D j on total
industry revenue can be decomposed into two parts: one is the inter-movie
effect ∂R j
∂D j
, which measures how movie j’s piracy affects movie j’s own rev-
enue; the second is an inter-movie effect ∂
∑
j′, j R j′
∂D j
which measures how movie
j’s piracy affects other movie’s revenue.
In the previous literature, empirical research has exclusively focused on
the direct effect. The magnitude of the inter-movie effect remains unclear as
most research assumed that each movie can be treated as a segregated market,
piracy’s competition effects are assumed to exist only within-movie. This is
understandable because most research used a linear reduced-form regression
framework, making it very hard to incorporate competition effects as this re-
quires including a full set of each movie’s piracy on the right-hand side of the
equation, which is computationally infeasible in reality.
The use of the logit demand model, in contrast, provides an opportunity to
examine inter-movie effects of piracy, as competition between movies is natu-
rally incorporated in the model. I conducted a formal decomposition exercise
to quantify the magnitude of intra-movie and inter-movie effects of piracy, de-
scribed in a later section.
3.6 Model
Models of movies demand with realistic substitution pattern and taking into
account consumer heterogeneity are pivotal in examining the effect of file-
sharing. In this section, I present a static random coefficient demand model
of movies from both legal source and file-sharing based on Berry et al. (1995).
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Figure 3.2: Average Weekly Audience and Downloads per Movie by Weeks
after Release
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Figure 3.3: Downloads Composition by Theatrical Availability for Top 50
Downloaded Movies
Notes: This figure breaks total downloads into three part: downloads during wide release period (when studio arrange more than 1000
screens nationwide), downloads during limited release (0-1000 screens) and downloads after theatrical exit. The figure shows top
50 movies in terms of aggregate downloads, for comparison I restrict movies to have at least 40 weeks in theatre by the end of my
sampling period.
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It is well acknowledged that random coefficient models can generate better
substitution pattern that can get rid of the unrealistic IIA assumption in multi-
nomial logit demand models.
In the model, time is discrete and indexed by t, the decision period is one
week in length. At each time period consumer face a set of products in the
market. A product is defined as a movie that is currently showing in the cinemas
or available to download on the Internet at a given period. Let m indexes movie
titles and b denotes channel ( i.e. b = 1 denotes illegal download and b = 0
denotes in legal purchase cinemas). A product is indexed by j, and defined
as the pair consist of a movie title m and a channel b. The set of all available
products isJ . For notational convenience, I first define a mapping f : J 7→ M
and a mapping g : J 7→ B that map a given product j ∈ J to its movie title
m ∈ M and its channel b ∈ B, respectively.
Consumer i’s utility from a product j which belongs to movie m at time t
via channel b is:
ui jt = X jtβi + ξ jt + εi jt (3.1)
where X jt is a vector of observed movie characteristics including the following
time-invariant characteristics average movie ratings in IMDB, genres, MPAA
rating, last and most importantly a dummy variable Pirated which equals 1
if it’s illegal piracy, it captures the utility difference between choosing illegal
piracy and legal purchase.10 Besides the above-mentioned variables, X jt also
includes time-varying characteristics weeks after release which are used to cap-
ture the decay pattern of sales and downloads. ξ jt measures the time-varying
product unobservable qualities. βi is a vector of individual-specific taste pa-
rameters associated with these observed movie characteristics. Lastly, εi jt is
the idiosyncratic consumer taste shock following Type-I Extreme Value distri-
bution.
Consumer have heterogeneous taste over a series of characteristics. The
heterogeneous taste takes a random-coefficient logit form which is a standard in
literature (Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001).The distribution of consumer tastes
parameters for movie characteristics is modelled as multivariate normal: the
taste of consumer i for characteristic k is denoted by βik = βk + vikσk where vik
10Notice that I did not include price coefficient in this specification, so one should treat the coefficient associated
with Pirated as a combination a taste effect and a price effect.
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is a mean zero taste shock for characteristic k. To write in matrix form:
βi = β¯ + Σvi (3.2)
I did not include random coefficient on all characteristics, let K denote the set
of characteristics that have random coefficients and suppose I have K charac-
teristics that have random-coefficients. vi = {vi1, vi2...viK} is the vector form of
unobservable consumer characteristics following a multivariate standard nor-
mal distribution. Σ is a scaling diagonal matrix.
I then rewrite the utility function into the following form:
ui jt = δ jt︸︷︷︸
Mean Utility
+
∑
k∈K
X jt,kvikσk + εi jt︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
Error Component
(3.3)
δ jt is the commonly called “mean utility” which captures the deterministic
component of utility that is common to all consumers:
δ jt = X′jtβ¯ + ξ jt
Now let us consider the error component of equation (3.3), which is the
“random” or individual specific part of the utility. The second component∑
k∈K X jt,kvikσk introduce correlation for choice of same characteristics in X jt.
For instance, let characteristics X jt,k be the dummy variable corresponding to
Action movies. If vik is high, which indicate consumer i have higher taste
for Action movies, then consumer tastes for all alternative action movie will
be high. This component is the main difference between random-coefficient
logit demand and multinomial logit demand. If we remove this component, the
model becomes standard multinomial logit.
Consumer i can also choose the outside option to neither buy nor pirate any
movies. The introduction of outside option gives consumers flexibilities to turn
to other non-movie activities, therefore rules out the unrealistic assumption that
one download must transfer into one sale if file sharing is disabled. The utility
of outside option is defined as:
ui0t = ε0t (3.4)
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Consumer i chooses one among all options to maximize his utility. Since
the error term ε jt follows extreme value distribution, consumer i’s choice prob-
ability of movie j at time t can be written as:
Pri jt =
exp(δ jt +
∑
k∈K X jt,kvikσk)
1 +
∑
j′
exp(δ j′t +
∑
k∈K X j′t,kvikσk)
(3.5)
And the market share of product j is then:
s jt =
∫
Pri jt f (vi; Σ)dvi (3.6)
Since I observe the same movie title across multiple weeks and channels,
I can add movie title dummies to control for all time/channel-invariant charac-
teristics of movies following Nevo (2001). One important benefit of including
movie titles dummies and time fixed effects is that it helps improve fit of the
model and serves to correct the potential bias caused by the correlation between
observable movie characteristics and unobservable quality. Now market spe-
cific deviation from mean valuation ∆ξ jt = ξ jt − ξm with f ( j) = m. ∆ξ jt will
serve as the new econometric error term, compared with the previous assump-
tion, it is more plausible to assume that movie characteristics are predetermined
and not responsive to shocks of unobservable ∆ξ jt.
Let I j be a M × 1 vector of movie title dummies. The vector of characteris-
tics X jt can be separated into two parts: one part X
(1)
m is time/channel-invariant
and movie title-specific characteristics,11 and the rest part X(2)jt . When movie ti-
tles dummies are added, the demand model specified in equation (3.3) remains
the same, but I do need to modify δ jt:
δ jt = I′jθ + X
(2)′
jt β¯
(2) + ∆ξ jt
Where θ is a 1×M vector of coefficients on movie title dummies represent-
ing mean quality corresponding to a movie title. Once movie title dummies
have been introduced, the new vector of observable characteristics X jt can not
include time-invariant characteristics, because all variations in time-invariant
variables are absorbed by these movie title dummies. Therefore, X(1)m has to be
11I use X(1)m as a short-hand notation for X
(1)
j when f ( j) = m
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dropped from in the above equation. Let θm be the mth element of θ. For each
movie title m I have:
θm = X(1)
′
m β¯
(1) + ξm (3.7)
I allow for heterogeneous tastes for movie titles. There are good reasons
to do so. Adding random coefficients on observables only allows consumers
to have different tastes for observable characteristics. While this is perhaps
enough to generate flexible substitution patterns for some markets, such as ce-
real, where products differ in relatively few observable dimensions, it becomes
difficult in other settings, such as the movie market, where product differen-
tiations take place in so many dimensions. For instance, consumers could be
particularly fond of a particular story, a particular character, a particular ac-
tress, etc. This is difficult to capture with a limited number of observables.
Therefore, allowing consumer preference heterogeneity on these unobservable
movie characteristics will help to generate more flexible substitution patterns
needed in the context of this paper.
The existence of multiple channels helps here, as I am able to observe
multiple products associated with each movie title. Therefore, I can adopt an
easy solution to incorporate heterogeneous taste on unobservable movie qual-
ity. Specifically, I add random coefficients to the movie title dummies. This
helps generate correlation of preference within the same movie title. For ex-
ample, it allows for an Ironman movie ticket to be a closer substitute to an
Ironman pirated movie than a Batman movie. The implementation is straight-
forward. To begin, I modify equation (3.3) by adding an additional random
component:
ui jt = δ jt +
∑
k∈K
X jt,kvikσk +
M∑
m=1
I j,mwimσw + εi jt (3.8)
where I j,m denotes the mth element of I j. Similarly to vi , wi = {wi1,wi2, ...,wiM}
is another set of unobservable consumer characteristics representing taste for a
given movie title, also following multivariate normal distribution: wi ∼ N(0,Ωw),
where Ωw is the diagonal variance-covariance matrix. Because of the substan-
tial number of movie titles, it would be computationally difficult to allow the
standard deviations of random coefficients to be movie title-specific. For com-
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putational simplicity, I restrict the standard deviations of taste on movie titles
to be the same for all titles. i.e. Ωw = σwI. Compared with the previous
specification, this adds only one more parameter, σw, to estimate.
3.7 Estimation Procedure and Result
3.7.1 Estimation Procedure
Following the estimation procedure of Berry et al. (1995), I use GMM to esti-
mate the model’s parameters. The estimation procedure is a nested fixed point
algorithm: in the inner loop I solve a contraction mapping to get the mean
utility δ’s from the market shares. In the outside loop the econometric error
term ∆ξ is interacted with instruments to form the GMM objective function.
The GMM estimator is obtained by minimizing the objective function using
Nelder-Mead method:
(Σˆ, σˆw) = argmin
Σ,σw
∆ξ(Σ, σw)′ZΦ−1Z′∆ξ(Σ, σw) (3.9)
Where Φ−1 is the optimal GMM weighting matrix. My data consists of
movie characteristics {X jt} and market shares {s jt}. The parameters need to
estimate includes {β¯(2), θ,Σ, σw}. Given the data and a guess of nonlinear pa-
rameters {Σ, σw}, I can solve the contraction mapping in the inner loop of the
estimation algorithm:
δn+1jt = δ
n
jt + ln(s jt) − ln(S (X jt, δnjt; Σ, σw)) (3.10)
where S (X jt, δnjt; Σ, σw) is the simulated market share:
S (X jt, δnjt; Σ, σw) =
1
nind
∑
i
Pri jt(X jt, vi,wi; β,Σ, σw) (3.11)
nind is the number of simulated individuals in the model, which is set to 500.
Following Dube et al. (2012), I set the convergence tolerance of the contrac-
tion mapping to be 10−8 to avoid propagation of simulation error which affects
parameter estimates.
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Including movie title dummies requires modifications of the conventional
estimation procedure. One can recover the mean taste for time-invariant char-
acteristics by a two step procedure as implemented in Nevo (2001). First, after
I solve for the mean utility δ’s, I can regress them on X(2)jt and movie title dum-
mies I j to obtain the estimates of {β¯(2), θ}. In addition, the estimated residuals
from this regression correspond to the econometric error term ∆ξ’s. I then ap-
ply GMM to the set of moment conditions in order to estimate {Σ, σw}:
E[Z∆ξ(Σ, σw)] = 0 (3.12)
where Z is a set of instruments discussed in previous section. Once the non-
linear parameters {Σ, σw}, together with {β¯(2), θ} is obtained, at the second step
I can use equation (3.7) to recover mean taste parameters for the title-invariant
characteristics via the linear regression depicted before.
Identification Distributions of random coefficients are identified using vari-
ations in choice sets and the corresponding change in market shares. For ex-
ample, if three movies A, B, and C are offered, A and C have the same budget
but very different ratings, while B and C have the same rating but very dif-
ferent budgets. Suppose we observe that movie C exits the market, then the
magnitude of how consumers of C shift to movie A and movie B will help
determine the distributions of the random coefficient on budget and rating, re-
spectively. The features of the movie market provide good sources of variation
in the choice set. In my 40-week period of data sample, I observe a large num-
ber of entries and exits of products coming from the theatrical release and the
exit of the movie, release of the DVD, and leaks of the pirated version. This
rich variation in the choice set provides a key source of identification of the
random coefficients and associated substitution patterns.
Instruments For identification of the random coefficients, I maintain the
assumption that own time-invariant product characteristics are uncorrelated
with market specific deviation of mean valuation ∆ξ. Given the assumptions,
I choose a set of differentiation-instruments in line with Gandhi and Houde
(2016) which approximate the optimal instruments of Chamberlain (1987). The
instruments are:
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• own product characteristics
• ∑ j′ ‖X jt,k − X j′t,k‖2 for each characteristics k
• sum of number of rival product where difference between rival product
characteristics and own product characteristics less than one standard de-
viation of product characteristics.∑
j′ 1{‖X jt,k − X j′t,k‖ < sd(Xk)} for each characteristics k
3.7.2 Estimation Results
This section reports the estimation results of my models. I report the results
of demand estimations in Table 3.3. The mean coefficient on piracy, which
represents the taste for piracy is -24.248, the standard deviation of the random
coefficient is 12.391, which shows that people’s preference for piracy is quite
dispersed. The magnitude of the piracy random coefficient suggests that for
preference for piracy there are many consumers at the extreme: on one hand,
a significant fraction of consumers have extremely high preference for piracy,
representing those “die hard” pirates; on the other hand, there are also con-
sumers having extremely negative utility for consuming piracy, representing
those people with no access to file-sharing technology. This has important im-
plication for counterfactuals. Basically, the substitution pattern indicates that it
will be very hard for consumers at those extremes to move across channels (il-
legal downloads/legal purchase). On the other hand, the standard deviation for
movie fixed effects is significant but has relatively small magnitude. Therefore,
the high dispersion restricts the effectiveness of piracy content removal.
For movie genres, the standard deviation of comedy, foreign and science
fiction have relatively high magnitude compares with other genres like drama
and cartoon. It suggest that consumers have very heterogeneous preference for
comedy, foreign and science fiction movies. For MPAA ratings, the standard
deviation terms are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, indicating
that consumer heterogeneity mainly exists on genres.
Now I turn to discuss how products progress after their releases. The decay
pattern of movie consumption suggests that consumer prefer newly released
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Table 3.3: Demand Estimation Results
Variable Mean Std Dev
Pirated -24.248*** 12.391***
(2.712) (1.320)
Weeks after Release -1.182***
(0.114)
Movie FE 0.939***
(0.177)
Invariant Movie Charactersitics
Rating 0.141***
(0.043)
Sequel 0.103 2.774***
(0.277) (0.168)
Genres
Action 0.794*** 0.009
(0.294) (0.885)
Comedy -10.546*** 6.617***
(0.260) (0.075)
Drama -0.744*** 1.925***
(0.221) (0.126)
Science Fiction -8.749*** 7.289***
(0.507) (0.114)
Horror 0.733* 0.015
(0.341) (1.354)
Cartoon -0.231 1.589***
(0.414) (0.100)
Foreign -4.863*** 3.206***
(0.312) (0.159)
MPAA Ratings
PG 1.492*** 0.003
(0.297) (0.689)
PG-13 1.898*** 0.002
(0.221) (0.274)
R 1.155*** 0.204
(0.201) (0.202)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at 0.005, 0.01, and 0.05 levels
respectively. Based on 5625 observations. Cast and Director are variables ranging from 0 to 100 measuring the
strength of cast and director in terms of previous box-office performance. Vriable Age is a binary variable indicates
whether or not individual is older than 40. Variable Income is the log of annual income and variable Internet Speed is
the log of the speed of Internet. For full model, movie dummies and interaction terms of Pirated with contry dummies
are included. Coefficients of time-invarying movie characterristics are obtained from regressing movie fixed effects
on time-invarying movie characterristics.
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Figure 3.4: Growth of Average Implied Unobservable Quality ∆ξ jt for Pirated
Products by Tenure
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movies. In the estimation result, the negative coefficient on Weeks after Re-
lease confirms the fact that consumer utility for movie product diminishes over
time. When tenure of movie increase by one week, consumer utility drops by
1.182. Another interesting question is how does piracy quality change over
time? Due to a lack of actual quality data, I use piracy products’ estimated
∆ξ jt as measures for perceived quality after controlling for time trends. Figure
3.4 plots the growth if average implied quality for piracy products by tenure.
There is a clear upward trend suggest that piracy quality improves continually
during the first 15 weeks. The quality of piracy peaks around 16th week after
theatrical release, roughly in line with the average DVD/Bluray release time
for movies. The implied quality then stabilizes and slightly decreases possibly
due to the drop in concurrent downloaders which limits download speed.
3.8 Counterfactual Experiments
The most important task in this study was to estimate the true cost of file-
sharing on movie box office revenue and its welfare implications. In this sec-
tion, I conduct several counterfactual experiments to estimate the true cost
of file-sharing on box office revenue. First, I conduct a “No-Piracy” exper-
iment that removes all pirated movie products in my models and compared
the counterfactual box office revenue and consumer welfare with the bench-
mark. Second, I use partial removal experiments to decompose intra-movie
and inter-movie substitution effects of piracy, I iteratively remove only pirated
versions of each movie, while leaving other movies’ pirated version untouched.
Comparisons between recovered revenue for the removed movie and all other
movies are then used to quantify the two effects.
3.8.1 Estimate Industry Loss
I remove all pirated movies in the model and recalculated counterfactual mar-
ket shares using the estimated full model parameters in Table 3.3. Assuming
price is the same after the no-piracy policy, I can then calculate counterfactual
industry revenue as the product of market share times market size and price.
Following Train (2003), consumer welfare at time t is calculated as the mar-
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Table 3.4: Result of No-Piracy Counterfactual Experiment
With Piracy No Piracy Percentage Change
Industry Revenue(billion) 8.527 8.620 1.09%
Consumer Welfare(billion) 10.849 8.614 -20.6%
ket size times the average of expected maximum value of indirect utility of
simulated individuals:
CS t = M
1
|α|
1
nind
∑
i
E[maxui jt] (3.13)
where α is the mean price coefficient used to translate utility into terms of
money value12 and M denotes market size.
The result of the counterfactual experiment is shown in Table 3.4. The
elimination of pirated movies on file-sharing will result in an increase of indus-
try revenue of $93 million during a 40 week period. The number represents a
1.09% increase in total box office revenue.13 Consumer welfare decreases by $
2.235 billion when piracy is banned, mostly affecting consumers who have high
preference for piracy. The number is much higher than the increase in motion
picture industry revenue. There is a dead weight loss of $ 2.14 billion if we ban
movie piracy. In general, the counterfactual result suggests that piracy indeed
reduces firm revenue, but also increases consumer welfare which is higher than
the initial loss. Hence, the policy that eradicating movie file-sharing may re-
sult in transfer of large reduction of consumer welfares into small increase in
industry revenue, resulting in socially inefficient outcomes from just the social
welfare point of view. However, if I decompose the welfare improvement by
consumer preference for piracy (ai), I find the piracy’s welfare improvement
disproportionately benefits those “pirates”: consumers who have positive pref-
erence for piracy (ai > 0). The decomposition shows that 98.3% of piracy’s
total welfare improvement is on consumers with positive preference on piracy.
Meanwhile only 1.7% of welfare improvement belongs to consumers with neg-
12Because I did not attempt to estimate price elasticity in this paper, I parametrize the α as 0.16 according to
Davis (2002).
13For comparison with widely cited industry studies: In 2005, the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA) estimated that they were losing $3 billion in box office sales due to piracy according to De Vany and
Walls (2007).
3.8. Counterfactual Experiments 53
ative preference for piracy (ai < 0). The removal of piracy will mainly affect
pirates and have relatively small effects on consumers from legitimate channels.
If we use a “naive” way to estimate the revenue loss, assuming that one
download equals one lost sale of paid movies, then the estimated revenue loss
amounts to 1.265 billion dollars for the same time periods, which is 13.6 times
the revenue loss calculated in the counterfactual experiment. Many widely
cited industry studies have employed this “Naive” method in their estimation of
piracy’s cost. The result shows that using such methodology will substantially
inflate the true loss from piracy.
I also calculate the average displacement rate of pirated movies on legiti-
mate movie sales in theatres. On average one download displaces legitimate
sales by 0.07 unit.
3.8.2 Decomposing Inter-Movie Substitution and Intra-Movie
Substitution
In this subsection, I decompose the intra-movie and inter-movie substitution
effect of piracy. Start again from the simple decomposition in previous section.
An analog in counterfactual experiment for the total effects would be the sum
of recovered revenue for all movie when movie j’s piracy is removed. Intra-
movie effects of movie j’s piracy can be quantified using the recovered revenue
for movie j itself, while inter-movie effects can be quantified using sum of
recovered revenue from all the other movies.
∂R
∂D j
=
∂
∑
j′ R j′
∂D j︸    ︷︷    ︸
total effect
=
∂R j
∂D j︸︷︷︸
intra-movie effect
+
∂
∑
j′, j R j′
∂D j︸      ︷︷      ︸
inter-moive effect
Therefore, the ideal counterfactual experiment would be to partially remove
only piracy of each particular movie and compare the intra-movie recovered
revenue with inter-movie recovered revenue.
Such counterfactual experiment can be also seen as approximation of pri-
vate copyright protection measure. Copyright protections are not always initi-
ated by the government or legislation, where policy are tend to affect the whole
industry. In recent years private copyright protection initiated by firms tar-
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geting at individual copyrighted work becomes more and more prevalent. In
motion picture industry, studios hires internet surveillance company to monitor
and send DMCA notices to take down torrents files on file-sharing websites.
As Reimers (2016) pointed out, such private copyright protections are ef-
fective in the book publishing industry. How effective are those private copy-
right protection efforts targeted to remove piracy for individual movies? Will
the downloader substitute its paid version, other pirated movies, or simply the
outside options?
To implement this counterfactual experiment, for each movie I eliminate
all its piracy across all time periods, but leave pirated versions of other movies
untouched. I then calculate counter-factual market shares and counter-factual
revenue increase for that movie.
Table 3.5 shows the comparison of the average movie’s revenue increase
between this partial removal counterfactual experiment and the full removal
experiment. Not surprisingly, the average revenue increase dropped from 0.170
to 0.014 million dollars, only 8% of the average recovered revenue by eradicat-
ing all piracy. In this counterfactual, most downloaders will choose the other
available pirated movie or other similar movies instead because in many cases
the availability of the original movie in theatres is small. This comes as no sur-
prise given the high dispersion in estimated preference for piracy. Removing
other movies’ piracy, however, indirectly helps this movie’s revenue through
positive spillovers from inter-movie substitution.
On average, I find sizable spillover effects resulting from inter-movie sub-
stitution. Removal of one movie can indirectly increase the revenue of other
movies by 0.055 million dollars, roughly four times the recovered revenue from
intra-movie substitution effects.
The existence and large magnitude of the inter-movie substitution effects
indicate: (1) The successful battle against piracy requires all studios to take ac-
tion against piracy, movie studios are interconnected as industry revenue will be
severely affected if some studios fail to deter piracy of their movies. (2) Anti-
piracy efforts can have large positive externalities to other firms, this public
goods nature might disincentivize provision of anti-piracy efforts, especially
for studios treating each other as competitors than cooperators. Government
involvement may be needed for subsidy and coordination of the copyright pro-
tection efforts. (3) Research attempt to estimate the effects of piracy should
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Table 3.5: Comparison of Revenue Increase from two Counter-Factual Experi-
ment
($ millions) Full Removal Partial Removal
Average Recovered revenue 0.170 0.014
Notes: This Panel summarize the distribution of recovered revenue under full removal and partial removal. For partial removal exercises, I
iteratively remove and only remove the piracy product for each movie and calculate the improved revenue.
Table 3.6: Decomposition: Intra-movie vs Inter-movie Effect
($ millions) Intra-movie Effects Inter-movie Effect
(self) (others)
Average Recovered revenue 0.014 0.055
Notes: This Panel reports the size of intra-movie effects and inter-movie effects. The “Inter-movie Effect” calculate the sum of improved
revenue on all other movies and “Intra-movie Effects” measures improved revenue on the movie itself.
also consider the inter-movie substitution effects, especially for the motion pic-
tures industry. Focusing exclusively on intra-movie effects will underestimate
the actual damage from piracy.
3.9 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of piracy on movie box-office revenue using a
novel data of illegal movie download from BitTorrent networks. Motivated by
the data pattern that piracy downloads happen relatively late in most movies’
theatrical windows, I estimate a random-coefficient demand model of movie
consumption to decompose the intra-movie and inter-movie substitution ef-
fects. I find that the revenue loss due to piracy’s inter-movie substitution is on
average four times as large as intra-movie substitution. This is quite surprising
considering only direct or intra-movie substitution will seriously underestimate
piracy’s damage. In addition, my damage estimates show that piracy reduces
total revenue of the motion picture industry from box office sales by $ 93 mil-
lion in total, 1.09% of the current box office revenue. The estimates are smaller
than widely cited industry estimates constantly referenced in policy making,
the “naive” methodology that assumes full sale displacement will inflate the
true cost 13.6 times. In addition, anti-piracy campaigns that remove piracy
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for individual movies have limited benefits to box office revenue because most
downloaders just substitute into other pirated movies.
The findings of this paper serve to provide extra evidence to assist resolu-
tion of the current heated debate on controversial issues regarding intellectual
property. For policy makers, the findings in this paper highlight the impor-
tance of considering outside option and substitution in evaluating the effect of
file-sharing;, research omitting these factors will substantially overestimate the
negative effects of file- sharing and should be treated with caution for policy
making. For the industry, the finding in this paper can be used by motion pic-
ture studios to determine the optimal level of copyright protection given the
high cost of supervision and litigation.
An interesting question I did not answer in this paper is how the supply of
movies is affected by file-sharing since I take movie release as exogenous in
my model. An interesting extension of this paper would be to model the movie
release decision as an entry game given the estimated demand system. This
would help to find the effect of file-sharing on producer incentives to supply
new products, which is also an important question worth exploring in the future.
Chapter 4
Quantifying the
Heterogeneous Effects of
Piracy on the Demand for
Movies
4.1 Introduction
Although two decades of research on file-sharing and piracy has not produced
a consensus on the impact of piracy on legitimate sales, it does show us that the
issue is more complex than we think. Traditionally researchers have focused
attention on the cannibalization effect of piracy, yet studies on different markets
over different time periods generate drastically different conclusions regarding
the impact of piracy on sales. Such differences indicate that the issues of piracy
are more subtle than we previously perceived.
First, there might be substantial heterogeneity in the effects of piracy. There
are two aspects of heterogeneity. (1) The market for pirated goods is highly
differentiated by circulation method (e.g., street piracy vs. online piracy) and
quality (e.g., pirated movies from low-quality camera recordings vs. pirated
movies ripped from Blu-ray). (2) Copyrighted goods such as movies are usu-
ally distributed via different channels, which have distinct product features,
prices, and release times. As substitutability is driven by these characteris-
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tics, different types of piracy and copyrighted goods from different distribution
channels may have heterogeneous substitution patterns. For example, pirated
movies ripped from Blu-ray might be closer substitutes to home-video sales of
DVDs/Blu-rays than a low-quality bootleg video from a theatre recording.
Second, besides the obvious cannibalization effect, it is possible that piracy
can have positive effects on sales through various channels.1 One notable chan-
nel for such positive effect is through word-of-mouth (WOM). Pirated con-
sumers can spread the word and make recommendations to other consumers.
It helps create a “buzz” for the product and eventually benefits its sales. Sev-
eral papers have focused on the WOM aspect of piracy (Lu et al., 2019, Ma
et al., 2014, Peukert et al., 2017) and have shown that there is significant WOM
generated from piracy consumption. Given the existence of WOM, piracy con-
sumption might induce positive spillovers onto legitimate sales. Therefore, it
will be difficult to conclude the true effect of digital piracy without knowing (1)
the heterogeneous effects of different pirated consumption on legitimate sales
and (2) the magnitude of the positive effect of pirated consumption on sales.
The goal of this paper is to answer these questions that are at the centre
of current debates. Using a novel dataset of movie illegal downloads on file-
sharing network BitTorrent with information on torrent quality, I classify piracy
into different types and estimate a rich demand model to quantify the heteroge-
neous effects of piracy on movie sales. I focus on two types of heterogeneity:
(1) how the effects differ by video quality of pirated movies; (2) how the effects
differ on two different channels of sales: box office and home-video (DVD/Blu-
ray) sales.
Utilizing data on movie’s weekly WOM measured by Google search vol-
ume, I also take into account the potential complementarity between piracy and
sales through the spread of WOM. I decompose the effects of piracy on sales
into a negative cannibalization effect and a positive WOM effect.
Quantifying the heterogeneous effects of piracy has important managerial
implications. Understanding the heterogeneous effects of piracy helps firms
to effectively allocate their efforts on protection for different channels of sales
against different types of piracy according to the differences in their effects.
Under some circumstances, when the positive effects outweigh the negative
1Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) and Belleflamme and Peitz (2014) provide a more comprehensive survey of the
literature on the positive effects of digital piracy
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effects, firms can utilize piracy as a promotional tool under the right timing.
The findings of this paper are as follows. First, on-line movie piracy re-
duces the total revenue of the motion picture industry from the box office by
$231 million in total, or about 2.71% of the current box office during my 40
weeks sampling period in 2015. The estimates are smaller than many widely
cited industry estimates often referenced in media. The “naı¨ve” methodology
of assuming full sale displacement will inflate the true cost by a factor of 5.
However, responses differ substantially by channels. Unlike the box office, in
the home-video market, DVD revenue would increase by 36% if there were
no piracy. On average, one movie suffers a 40-week monetary loss of $1.24
million because of file sharing in 2015. Second, different qualities of piracy
play different roles. High quality is a closer substitute to sales, but the re-
moval of high-quality piracy alone does not solve the problem, as consumers
have a strong preference for piracy and will substitute to low-quality piracy.
Third, the results of the welfare analysis show that file sharing increases con-
sumer welfare by a total of $7.05 billion. Lastly, I examine the magnitude of
the word-of-mouth (WOM) effects of piracy on sales revenue and find that the
WOM effects have a small and positive impact on the industry revenue.
The most important contribution of this paper to the literature is to quantify
the heterogeneous effects of piracy. Most studies on movie piracy have focused
exclusively on the total effect of piracy on only one particular distribution chan-
nel. Very few studies have assessed and compared the heterogeneous effects by
different types of piracy and by different distribution channels. The heteroge-
neous results I obtain in this paper suggest that public policies towards piracy
should not be over-generalized, as different types of piracy have distinct influ-
ence over different channels of sales. For example, the positive WOM brought
by low-quality piracy make it useful as a promotional tools for studios.
A few papers have attempted to examine the positive role played by piracy.
Notable channels include positive effects on demand for complementary goods
(Papies and van Heerde, 2017; Leung, 2015), indirect appropriability (Liebowitz,
1985), sampling effects (Kretschmer and Peukert (2017)). The most similar pa-
pers in the context of movies are Lu et al. (2019) and Ma et al. (2014), which
also examine the word-of-mouth effects of piracy on the box office. I comple-
ment these studies by directly modelling the consumer choice of piracy using a
flexible random-coefficient demand model that attempts to capture and explain
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the rich heterogeneity of the effects of piracy on movie sales.
In addition to the empirical literature on file sharing, this paper is also re-
lated to the growing literature on the motion picture industry. Researchers have
studied different aspects of the motion picture industry, for example: spatial
competition of movie theatres (Davis, 2006), social spillover, and WOM (Chin-
tagunta et al., 2010; Moul, 2007; Moretti, 2011; Gilchrist and Sands, 2016b),
seasonality in the motion picture industry (Einav, 2007), uniform pricing prac-
tices (Orbach and Einav, 2007), movie price elasticity (Davis, 2002; De Roos
and McKenzie, 2014), effects of uncertainty in the movie industry (De Vany
and Walls, 1999; Elberse and Eliashberg, 2003), and strategic entry and exit
decisions of studios and theatres (Einav, 2010; Takahashi, 2015; Dalton and
Leung, 2017). This paper adds to the literature on the effect of file sharing on
the motion picture industry.
This paper is also related to the marketing and economics literature study-
ing the WOM effect and viral marketing (Dellarocas, 2003; Godes and May-
zlin, 2004; Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Trusov et al., 2009; Zhu and Zhang,
2010). Many papers try to assess the role of WOM as either a predictor or
influencer for sales. There are a number of papers focused on the motion pic-
ture industry (Liu, 2006; Duan et al., 2008; Chintagunta et al., 2010; Dhar and
Weinberg, 2016). This paper adds to the literature by studying the WOM ef-
fect induced by movie piracy. I quantify the positive effects that movie piracy
brings to the movie sales revenue through WOM.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data and
some preliminary evidence. Section 4.3 discusses the model. The estimation
results are presented in Sections 4.4. Section 4.5 gives the results of the coun-
terfactual experiments, and Section 4.6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Data Description
In this paper, I combine data from several data sources. I assemble a dataset in-
cluding weekly information on movie-level box office sales, downloads, and
sales on DVD in United States. The movie piracy download data contain
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weekly downloads on BitTorrent in the United States. The details of the data
and its collection have been discussed in Chapter 3 and Appendix B.3.
The box office and DVD sale data are collected from the box office report-
ing service websites Boxofficemojo.com and The-numbers.com. I collect infor-
mation on weekly box office and movie characteristics for all movies showing
during the sampling period. I also collect information on movie characteris-
tics, such as movie ratings, sequels, genres, MPAA rating (G/PG/PG-13/R),
and weeks after release, which are commonly used in studies of the motion
picture industry. The movie critic rating data are collected from Internet Movie
Database (IMDB). Due to the uniform pricing practices in movie theatres and
the fact that movie price data are difficult to collect, only a country-level aver-
age admission price is obtained.
Word-of-mouth(WOM) data are collected from Google Trends, The Google
Trends search index measures the popularity of topics according to the number
of search queries using Google. As same movie can relate to multiple similar
search queries, to ensure better comparability and precision, I utilize Google’s
Freebase topic classification engines and extract the freebase topic identifier
related to each movie.2 Using the identifier, I collect weekly US Google trends
index in sampling period for each movie.3 The summary statistics are shown
in the next section.
4.2.2 Preliminary Data Pattern
Heterogeneity in Movie Piracy Pirated movies come in different format-
s/versions. Table 4.1 shows descriptions of different formats and classifications
based on video quality. There is substantial heterogeneity in quality across
different formats, and the video quality will generally improve over time. Af-
ter a movie has been released in the theatre, the earliest piracy is usually of
CAM(Camcording) format, produced by camera recording in the theatre. The
2For example, keywords “Furious 7” and “Fast and Furious 7” are all related to the same movie. the freebase
topic identifier automatically takes into consideration all search queries related to movie Furious 7.
3The raw Google trends data is normalized and takes integer value from 0 to 100, with 100 the highest search
volume and 0 the lowest. I use movie Titanic as reference group, with the search volume of Titanic at first week
of November 2015 at 97, all movie’s WOM is then standardized with respect to Titanic. Because Google censors
all search volume that are sufficiently low to 0, given that the scale of WOM is relatively large with average of
150 and max of 8400, in the end when take logarithm of WOM I take the log(1 + x) transformation.
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Table 4.1: Pirated Movie Format and Quality Classification
Format Description Timing Quality
CAM bootleg recording made in theaters Early Low
Telesync(TS) improved bootleg recording of a film
recorded in a movie theater, filmed using a
professional camera on a tripod in the pro-
jection booth.
Early Low
Telecine(TC) Pirated movie copy captured from film
print using a machine that transfers the
movie from its analog reel to digital format
Early High
DVDSCR Pirated movies copied from movie
screener for review purpose
Early/Late High
Web-DL/WebRip Pirated movies ripped from streaming ser-
vice
Late High
HDRip/HDTV Pirated movies captured using analog cap-
ture card from HDTV
Late High
DVDRip Pirated movies ripped from retail DVD Late High
Bluray/BRRip Pirated movies ripped from Blu-ray Late High
Notes: Descriptions are abridged from the Wikipedia page of each format. The classfication of quality is
based on source, any source from bootleg recording is classified as Low quality.
subsequent release of the Telesync version significantly improves the quality
of the CAM version, but it is still inferior compared to the quality of a DVD.
Other piracy formats come with much better quality, almost comparable to the
quality of a DVD, but take longer to release. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution
of the illegal torrent file formats.
Based on the uploaded date of illegal torrent files, I obtain the leak date by
illegal versions for each movie. Table 4.2 shows some summary statistics on
the timing of piracy leaks. On average, the first leak (usually the CAM version)
appears 4.7 weeks after the initial theatrical release. About 7.4 weeks after
the initial release comes the first high-quality piracy release (Telecine/Screen-
er/Webrip). About 17 weeks after the initial release, distributors will release
DVD and Blu-ray versions of the movie into the home-video market. The DVD
and Blu-ray versions of piracy (DVDrip/BRrip) happen almost instantly after
the home-video retail release. Piracy appears in only a fraction of movies. My
sample period covers the full theatrical windows of 694 movies, and for 78.4%
of movie titles, no available piracy of any kind is observed during theatrical
runs.
Are the effects of piracy on sales differ between high-quality and low qual-
ity piracy? I present some preliminary evidence to verify the conjecture on the
differential effects between high-quality and low-quality piracy on sales.
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Figure 4.1: Torrents Files Format Distribution
Notes: Figure 2 shows the distribution of torrent files formats. Most common formats are included in
my dataset. Category Other includes other uncommon formats, and torrents that shows no information of
format. For those with unknown format, I impute their quality use their appearance time, if it come at time
with more high quality torrents of the same movie, it is then classified as high quality torrent.
Table 4.2: Summary: Timing of Piracy Release by Format, Quality
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Timing
Weeks from Theatrical Release to Any Piracy Leaks 4.733 4.734 -1 23
Weeks from Theatrical Release to First High Quality Piracy Leaks 7.423 5.081 -1 23
(Telecine/DVDscreener)
Weeks from Theatrical Release to DVD/Blu-ray Piracy Release 17.161 5.820 6 52
(DVDrip/BRRip)
Fraction of Movies with No Leaks during Theatrical Run 78.4 %
Fraction of Movies with No High Quality Leaks during Theatrical Run 79.5 %
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Figure 4.2: Theatre Admission, DVD Unit Sale and Downloads by Weeks after
Release
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A shown in Table 4.2, for most movies, the availability of piracy resources
during the theatrical run differs substantially across movies and time. I can
compare changes in weekly box office sales of leaked movies before and af-
ter the time low-quality and high-quality piracy become available, against a
baseline of changes for movies with no piracy availability at the same period.
The specification is as follows:
ln(Boxo f f iceit) = βHHQLeakit+βLLQLeakit+
∑
j
1 {τit = j}+X′itγ+αi+λt+ηit
(4.1)
Here, the dependent variable ln(Boxo f f iceit) represents the natural log of the
weekly box office sales for movie i at time t. I include movie fixed effects αi
and calendar week fixed effects λt. To capture the decaying pattern of ticket
sales, I also include a series of release week dummies
∑
j 1 {τit = j}, where τit
is the count of the weeks after theatrical release with j = 1, 2, ..., J. Moreover,
HQLeakit is an indicator variable that equals 1 if high-quality piracy for movie
i has already leaked at time t. Similarly, LQLeakit is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if low-quality piracy for movie i has already leaked at time t. In the end,
Xit is the control including the log number of screens in week t for movie i.
The specification resembles a difference-in-difference (DD) specification.
The first difference is taken using the movie fixed effects, which controls for
time-invariant movie heterogeneity between the treated and control data. The
second difference is taken using the time fixed effects, which controls for the
general movie-invariant time trends before and after treatment (leaks). The
coefficients βH and βL measure the percentage changes of the box office of
movies after the emergence of high-quality piracy (βH) and low-quality piracy
(βL), respectively, against the baseline change of movies without presence of
piracy. I interpret negative coefficients of βL and βH as evidence of harm against
sales.4
4Although not pursuing a causal interpretation of my estimates, the estimates still give me some good ideas
on the correlation of piracy since the specification has already taken care of major sources of bias. A number
of unobservable factors are accounted for in the specification: (1) movie-specific time-invariant unobservable
heterogeneity (e.g., better movies attract more piracy and have more downloads), (2) general decreasing trend
of the box office over its release time (e.g., natural decaying patterns will not be falsely attributed to the effect
of piracy), and (3) time-variant but movie-invariant factors (e.g., box office and downloads both rise when the
summer holiday begins).
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Table 4.3 shows the results of these regressions. Column (1) reports esti-
mates without the calendar week fixed effects, while column (2) includes full
sets of fixed effects. In addition, βH is negative and statistically significant
in both specifications. Estimates with full set of fixed effects in column (2)
suggest that, as high-quality piracy becomes available, the box office drops by
19%. However, for low-quality leaks, the estimate is no longer statistically sig-
nificant and has a much smaller magnitude. These result are suggestive that
high-quality piracy is harmful to sales, but the harm from low-quality piracy is
indefinite and at least much more moderate.
Low-quality and high-quality piracy seem to play different roles here. Low-
quality piracy tends to be less substitutable with sales compared to high-quality
piracy. In addition, since low-quality piracy appears earlier than high-quality
piracy, it is more likely to benefit legitimate sales through WOM. These differ-
ences motivate me to model the types of piracy to highlight the different roles
played by these two types of piracy.
4.2.3 Summary Statistics
Before describing the model, I first describe the final data used for estima-
tion of the model. The basic observation is at product-time level. Because
for one movie there are potentially four channels that a consumer can get
access(theater/DVD/low-quality piracy/high-quality piracy), a product is there-
fore defined as a movie and channel pair.5
Table 4.4 provides sample descriptive statistics for the data at products
level. About 55% of the products are pirated movies, and about 7.8% are
DVDs. 82.5% of all products are of high video quality, which indicates 17.5%
of piracy product are low quality piracy. Bottom panel of Table 4.4 provides
information on the average product market shares by channels. The average
product market share of the ticket sales of a movie is about 0.077%, DVD sales
on average take up 0.039% of market share, while the average product market
share of the high video quality downloads of a movie is about 0.01%, low qual-
ity piracy products have the smallest average market share of 0.003%. Taken
5The box office of some independent movies is extremely small so that their market shares are indistinguish-
able from zero. Inclusion of these “zero” market share movies creates numerical problems to the estimation
procedure, so I drop all observations with a market share smaller than 0.0001% in my sample.
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Table 4.3: Preliminary Regression Estimates of impact of piracy by quality
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: ln(Boxo f f iceit) ln(Boxo f f iceit)
After Piracy Leaks
High Quality -0.1441∗∗ -0.1904∗∗∗
(0.0498) (0.0507)
Low Quality -0.0374 -0.0568
(0.0584) (0.0580)
Controls
ln(S creensit) 0.8841∗∗∗ 0.8769∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0077)
Movie FE X X
Week After Release Dummies X X
Calendar Week FE X
Observations 6805 6805
Adjusted R2 0.8586 0.8637
Standard errors in parentheses,observations are movie-week level
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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together, the illegal downloads account for less than 10% of all movie-watching
activities.
In terms of genre, the three most common genres are drama (19.1%), com-
edy (17.7%), and action (16.6%). Around 24% of products are sequel of previ-
ous movies. The average Word-of-mouth(WOM) index for a product is around
150, the distribution is skewed substantially to the right by the top big budget
“hit” movies. Rating on IMDB are on a scale of 0 to 10, the distribution of
rating has smaller dispersions with an average of 6.43 and a standard deviation
of 1.56.6
4.3 Model
Models of movie demand with a realistic substitution pattern, considering con-
sumer heterogeneity, are pivotal in examining the effects of digital piracy. In
this section, I present a static random-coefficient demand model of movies from
both legal and piracy sources based on the work by Berry et al. (1995). A
random-coefficient demand model introduces heterogeneity in consumer pref-
erence. By allowing for rich dimensions of heterogeneity in consumer pref-
erence, the model will allow for more flexible substitution patterns. This is
crucial for precisely measuring the effects of digital piracy on sales.
Basic Setup In the model, time is discrete and indexed by t, and the decision
period is one week in length. Each time period, consumer observes a number
of products in the market for movies in the US. A product is defined as a movie
that is currently showing in the cinemas, available on DVD/Blu-ray, or avail-
able to download on the Internet at a given period. Let m denote the movie title
andM be the set of all available movie titles. Let b denote the channel through
which consumers watch a movie. For a given movie title m ∈ M, there are up
to four channels to watch movie m depending on availability: by purchasing a
ticket at the theatre (b = 0), purchasing a DVD (b = 1), downloading a low-
quality illegal copy online (b = 2), or downloading a high-quality illegal copy
6As for the sensitivity of using IMDB ratings as measure of movie quality, I collect popular metrics from
other movie review websites including RottenTomatoes and Metacritic. The correlation coefficients between these
measures are relatively high. For wide release movies, the correlation coefficient between IMDB, RottenTomatoes
and Metacritic are 0.8021 and 0.7903, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics on Product Characteristics
Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Pirated .553 .497 0 1
DVD .078 .268 0 1
Home .631 .482 0 1
High Quality .825 .379 0 1
Word-of-mouth 150.382 327.698 1 8400
Rating 6.434 1.556 4 9.3
Sequel .243 .429 0 1
Genres
Action .166 .372 0 1
Comedy .177 .382 0 1
Drama .191 .393 0 1
Science Fiction .077 .268 0 1
Horror .081 .273 0 1
Cartoon .075 .264 0 1
Foreign .035 .186 0 1
MPAA Rating
PG .168 .374 0 1
PG-13 .368 .482 0 1
R .354 .478 0 1
Market Share
Ticket Sale( %) .077 .405
DVD Sale( %) .039 .405
High Quality Downloads( %) .010 .019
Low Quality Downloads( %) .003 .011
Observations 8617
Note: Pirated is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the movie has a pirated version available online. Rating
are on a scale of 0-10. Sale and Downloads in movie characteristics section are measured in units. Action,
Animation, Comedy, Drama, Horror, Science Fiction, PG, PG13, R are all genre and MPAA Rating dummy
variables. In the market share section, the market share is the average market shares for all observations.
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online (b = 3). Let B be the set of channels: B = {0, 1, 2, 3}. A product is
indexed by j, and defined as the combination of a movie title m and a channel
b. The set of all available products is J . For notational convenience, I first
define a mapping f : J 7→ M and a mapping g : J 7→ B that map a given
product j ∈ J to its movie title m ∈ M and its channel b ∈ B, respectively. In
each market, there are a number of consumers indexed by i. The market size is
set to the total population of the United States and is constant in the sampling
period.7
The utility of consumer i from product j of movie title m at time t is as
follows:
ui jt = W ′jtηi +αP jt +aiPirated j +ψiHQ j +γiH j +φln(WOMmt−1) + τt + ξ jt + εi jt
(4.2)
where W jt is a vector of observed movie characteristics, including movie title-
invariant characteristics, such as movie ratings in IMDb, genres, MPAA rating,
sequel, as well as weeks after release. ηi is a vector of individual-specific taste
parameters associated with these observed movie characteristics.
P jt denotes the price of the product, with price of the piracy set to 0. i.e.,
P jt = 0 if g( j) ∈ {2, 3}. The DVD prices are calculated by dividing the total
weekly sales revenue by the total weekly units sold. Because of the uniform
pricing practice in movie theatres and the difficulty to collect ticket price data,
I use the US country-level average admission price. Because of the lack of
price variation on the movie ticket, it is difficult to estimate the price elasticity
α in this paper. I parametrize the price coefficient according to the existing
literature on the movie industry. Davis (2002) uses a randomized control price
experiment in US movie theatres to allow the price coefficient to be precisely
estimated. Therefore, I parametrize my price coefficient according to the es-
timated price coefficient in the last column of Table 5 in Davis (2002).8 The
corresponding value of α is -0.16. The own price elasticity implied by the im-
puted price coefficient is −αP jt(1 − s jt) = 1.7515 using the average product
market shares of theatre ticket and average admission price.
7The constant market size assumption is not unresonable given that my data spans only 40 weeks
8In the estimated equation in Davis (2002), the dependent variable is δ j = ln(s j) − ln(s0) and explanatory
variables include mainly days of week dummies, linear and quadratic terms of “week at theater”, and interactions
of price with theater.
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Pirated j is an indicator variable which equals 1 if g( j) ∈ {2, 3}, i.e. product
j is from an illegal source(download). Therefore, ai denotes the individual-
specific difference in the mean valuation of legal movies and pirated movies.
Here I model ai with the following structure:
ai = a0i + rgenre (4.3)
Where a0i is the individual-specific constant term, and rgenre captures the
genre-specific difference in taste for piracy. The estimates of rgenre indicates
the relative amenability of each movie genres to piracy.
HQ j is a dummy variable for “high quality”, which equals 1 if g( j) ∈
{0, 1, 3} (i.e., consumers choose to watch a movie through one of three high-
quality channels: theatre, DVD, or high-quality download). The corresponding
ψi measures individual-specific tastes for high quality. H j is a dummy vari-
able for the product to have the “watched at home” attribute. It equals 1 if
g( j) ∈ {1, 2, 3} (i.e., consumers choose to watch through DVD or either low-
quality or high-quality download). γi measures individual-specific taste for
home watching experience. Because the seasonality in movie demand (Einav,
2007), I include the calendar week fixed effects τt to control for any general
time-specific demand shocks. ε jt is the unobservable product characteristics
and εi jt denotes an idiosyncratic shock following a Type I extreme value distri-
bution.
Word-of-mouth and Complementarity In the setting of the BLP model, pi-
rated movies and paid movies are by construction substitutes only. However,
complementarity might exist between piracy and the box office. A number of
recent researchers have found evidence of such complementarity through var-
ious channels. This could come from several different sources, such as the
sampling effect (Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006; Kretschmer and Peukert, 2017),
network effect (Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2014),
observation learning (Newberry, 2016), or backward spillover on product dis-
covery (Hendricks and Sorensen, 2009). One of the most important channels
is from spreading of WOM. The importance of WOM in influencing consumer
decisions has been extensively studied in economics and marketing literatures
(Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Liu, 2006; Gayer and Shy, 2003). It is par-
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ticularly important in the context of the movie market. Moretti (2011) found
that peer effects and social learning from WOM are important in movie con-
sumption. Gayer and Shy (2003) showed evidence supporting the existence of
network externalities in movie consumption.
Here, I model WOM as a bridge through which the complementarity be-
tween piracy consumption and sales is established. According to the previous
literature (Liu, 2006), two aspects of WOM have been highlighted as the most
important: volume and valence. volume measures the quantity of WOM gener-
ated, while valence focuses on the quality aspects that capture the positiveness
of WOM. In my model, I measure the valence with the movie rating in IMDB.
I assume that piracy does not influence the rating, and I put more emphasis on
the ability of piracy to influence the volume of WOM. Specifically, to quan-
tify the volume of WOM for a particular movie, I use the Google Trends search
volume as a proxy. The Google Trends search index measures the popularity of
topics according to the number of Google search queries.9 The Google Trends
index will proxy the WOM, especially online WOM, since WOM activities are
usually associated with searches on Google. In the utility function in equation
(4.2), I use the log of the Google Trends index to measure WOMmt. Because
word-of-mouth WOMmt is affected by both illegal downloads and legal sales, it
then allows piracy to have a spillover effect on current demand. The parameter
φ measures the magnitude of WOM in influencing demand.
Evolution of word-of-mouth I assume that both concurrent piracy and le-
gitimate consumption of a specific movie can help increase the current period
volume of WOM through communication and influence with uninformed con-
sumers. Evolution of WOMmt is assumed to follow an AR(1) process. It is a
function of movie title m’s previous word-of-mouth WOMmt−1 and total views
across all channels at time t. WOMmt evolves as below:
WOMmt = ρWOMmt−1 + κTotalViewsmt + pit + ωm + mt (4.4)
with TotalViewsmt defined as the sum of movie m’s views from all channels
at time t. pit is time fixed effects, ωm is movie title fixed effects which control
for unobservable time-invariant factors such as total advertisement and movie
9It should be noted that weekly Google trends index is a flow value.
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quality.
Preference Heterogeneity Similar to the model setup in Chapter 3, con-
sumers have heterogeneous tastes over a series of characteristics. The het-
erogeneous taste takes a random-coefficient logit form which is a standard in
literature (Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001).
For notational simplicity I collapse all product characteristics into a vector
X jt. X′jt =
{
W ′jt, P j, Pirated j,HQ j,H j,WOMmt−1
}
and the same for their cor-
responding taste parameters βi = {ηi, αi, δi, γi, φ, a}. Now let the dimension of
new X jt be K × 1 with K being the total number of characteristics. The demand
model described in equation (4.2) can be rewritten as:
ui jt = X′jtβi + ξ jt + εi jt (4.5)
Now let us turn to consumer tastes. Consumers have heterogeneous taste in
the model. The distribution of consumer tastes parameters for movie charac-
teristics is modelled as multivariate normal: the taste of consumer i for charac-
teristic k is denoted by βik = βk + vikσk where vik is a mean zero taste shock for
characteristic k. To write in matrix form:
βi = β¯ + Σvi (4.6)
I did not include random coefficient on all characteristics, let K denote the set
of characteristics that have random coefficients and suppose I have K charac-
teristics that have random-coefficients. vi = {vi1, vi2...viK} is the vector form of
unobservable consumer characteristics following a multivariate standard nor-
mal distribution. Σ is a scaling diagonal matrix.
To highlight consumer heterogeneity, equation (4.5) can be rewritten in the
following form:
ui jt = δ jt︸︷︷︸
Mean Utility
+
∑
k∈K
X jt,kvikσk + εi jt︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
Error Component
(4.7)
δ jt is defined as “mean utility” similar to Chapter 3, and the remaining
component of equation (4.7) represents the “random” or individual specific
part of the utility.
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δ jt = X′jtβ¯ + ξ jt
Consumers can also choose the outside option to neither buy nor download
any movies. The utility of outside option is defined as:
ui0t = ε0t (4.8)
Consumers choose one among all options to maximize his utility. Since the
error term ε jt follows extreme value distribution, consumer i’s choice probabil-
ity of movie j at time t can be written as:
Pri jt =
exp(δ jt +
∑
k∈K X jt,kvikσk)
1 +
∑
j′
exp(δ j′t +
∑
k∈K X j′t,kvikσk)
(4.9)
And the market share of product j is obtained by integrating individual choice
probability over the distributions of consumer characteristics:
s jt =
∫
Pri jt f (vi; Σ)dvi (4.10)
Adding Movie Title Dummies I add movie title dummies to control for all
time/channel-invariant characteristics of movies following Nevo (2001). As de-
scribed in Chapter 3, one important benefit of including movie titles and time
fixed effects is the improvement of fit of the model and help in correcting the
potential bias caused by the correlation between observable movie character-
istics and unobservable quality. I extract market specific deviation from mean
valuation ∆ξ jt = ξ jt − ξm with f ( j) = m. ∆ξ jt will serve as the new econometric
error term.
Let I j be a M × 1 vector of movie title dummies. The vector of characteris-
tics X jt can be separated into two parts: one part X
(1)
m is time/channel-invariant
and movie title-specific characteristics,10 and the rest part X(2)jt . When movie
titles dummies are added, δ jt is modified accordingly:
δ jt = I′jθ + X
(2)′
jt β¯
(2) + ∆ξ jt
10I use X(1)m as a short-hand notation for X
(1)
j when f ( j) = m
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Where θ is a 1×M vector of coefficients on movie title dummies represent-
ing mean quality corresponding to a movie title. Once movie title dummies
have been introduced, the new vector of observable characteristics X jt can not
include time-invariant characteristics, because all variations in time-invariant
variables are absorbed by these movie title dummies. Therefore, X(1)m has to be
dropped from in the above equation. Let θm be the mth element of θ. For each
movie title m I have:
θm = X(1)
′
m β¯
(1) + ξm (4.11)
Allow Heterogeneous Taste on Movie Titles In addition to the above-mentioned
specifications as benchmark, I also experiment with other specifications. One
extension is allowing for heterogeneous tastes for movie titles as in Chapter 3.
ui jt = δ jt +
∑
k∈K
X jt,kvikσk +
M∑
m=1
I j,mwimσw + εi jt (4.12)
where I j,m denotes the mth element of I j. Similarly to vi , wi = {wi1,wi2, ...,wiM}
is another set of unobservable consumer characteristics representing taste for a
given movie title, also following multivariate normal distribution: wi ∼ N(0,Ωw),
where Ωw is the diagonal variance-covariance matrix. Because of the substan-
tial number of movie titles, it would be computationally difficult to allow the
standard deviations of random coefficients to be movie title-specific. For com-
putational simplicity, I restrict the standard deviations of taste on movie titles
to be the same for all titles. i.e. Ωw = σwI. Compared with the previous
specification, this adds only one more parameter, σw, to estimate.
4.4 Estimation Results
The estimation procedure of the model is similar to that of Chapter 3. I use
GMM method to estimate the model. Differentiation instruments following
Gandhi and Houde (2016) is used to identify the random coefficients, the de-
tails of which have been described in Chapter 3. The econometric error term ∆ξ
is interacted with instruments to form the GMM objective function. Model pa-
rameters are obtained by minimizing the GMM objective function. Lastly, the
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AR(1) process of WOM is estimated outside of the main estimation procedure
via OLS using movie-week level observations.
This section reports the estimation results of my models. I report the results
of demand estimations of two specifications, including a random coefficient
logit model without heterogeneous taste on title-specific unobservable quality,
and a full random coefficient logit model including heterogeneous tastes for
movie titles. The results are shown in Table 4.5. I also show the results on the
law of motion for WOM, which is estimated outside of the main model.
I estimate two versions of the random-coefficient logit model. The first
version adds random coefficients on observables including pirated, high qual-
ity, home, movie genres, MPAA rating, which is shown in column (1). The
second version, which is the full version, allows consumers to have heteroge-
neous taste on movie titles by including additional movie random coefficients
on movie title dummies. In terms of random coefficients, the estimates show
that consumers have heterogeneity in genre characteristics, such as action, sci-
ence fiction, and cartoons. In terms of MPAA ratings, not much heterogeneity
seems to exist, as most standard deviation terms are not small.
Now, I turn to variables that are most important in determining substitution
between piracy and sales. The standard deviation of the random coefficient
in pirated is significant with a magnitude of 27.107, indicating evidence of
substantial consumer heterogeneity in taste for piracy. The distribution of con-
sumer taste in piracy is shown in Figure 4.3. Roughly 6.5% of all consumers
have positive preference for piracy. Consumer heterogeneity in home is also
large, with a standard deviation of 19.771. The standard deviation of the ran-
dom coefficient on movie title dummies is also significant, but with a smaller
magnitude of 5.321.
For movie genres, when I include the random coefficient on the movie title,
the standard deviation of genres, such as science fiction, decreases, indicat-
ing that some persistence of choice in genres is actually because of consumer
persistence in movie titles. As discussed in the previous section, the above-
mentioned parameters play a crucial role in determining the substitution pat-
terns. The standard deviation for a movie title is large relative to the standard
deviation for piracy, we should expect consumers to have strong persistence
with movie titles. If the movie m piracy version is eradicated, more consumers
would be diverted to other channels of watching movies m (DVD and theatre),
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Table 4.5: Demand Estimation Results
(1) (2)
Random Coefficient Logit Random Coefficient Logit
No Title RC Full Model
Mean β Std Dev σ Mean β Std Dev σ
Pirated -33.672*** 33.111*** -41.430*** 27.107***
(4.421) (4.056) (7.578) (4.341)
High Quality 12.099*** 10.118*** 1.510 5.095***
(0.864) (0.509) (1.736) (0.622)
Home -44.080*** 27.757*** -30.254*** 19.771***
(6.719) (2.444) (4.438) (1.805)
Weeks after Release -0.021 -0.079***
(0.020) (0.019)
Word-of-mouth 0.799*** 0.931***
(0.091) (0.092)
Movie Title 5.321***
(0.513)
Invariant Movie Charactersitics
Rating -0.036 0.605*
(0.052) (0.285)
Sequel 0.474 1.021 -3.768*** 8.425***
(0.309) (1.311) (0.469) (0.368)
Genres
Action -2.529*** 5.595*** -6.525*** 6.907***
(0.350) (0.381) (0.507) (0.234)
Comedy -0.247 1.300* 0.389 1.196*
(0.314) (0.605) (0.457) (0.515)
Drama -1.589*** 1.947*** -1.710*** 3.600***
(0.266) (0.430) (0.388) (0.623)
Science Fiction -40.485*** 32.444*** -11.063*** 9.204***
(0.578) (0.994) (0.879) (0.289)
Horror -0.571 0.658 -1.181* 2.459***
(0.403) (0.927) (0.581) (0.529)
Cartoon -1.889*** 3.988*** -3.602*** 4.696***
(0.499) (0.681) (0.731) (0.388)
Foreign -0.626 0.000 -0.953 0.000
(0.391) (6.654) (0.557) (2.548)
MPAA Ratings
PG -0.461 0.000 0.149 0.618
(0.349) (0.649) (0.526) (0.679)
PG-13 -0.292 0.949 0.775* 1.913***
(0.267) (0.582) (0.386) (0.381)
R -0.643** 0.000 -0.048 0.000
(0.251) (0.985) (0.351) (0.916)
Constant -38.528*** -29.102***
(0.383) (0.365)
Movie Title Dummies X X
Time Fixed Effect X X
Observations 8617 8617
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at 0.005, 0.01, and 0.05 levels respec-
tively. Based on 8617 observations anf 40 week period in United States. For full model, movie title dummies, time fixed
effects and interaction terms of Pirated with genres are included. Coefficients of time-invarying movie characterristics
are obtained from regressing movie fixed effects on time-invarying movie characterristics.
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Figure 4.3: Frequency Distribution of Consumer Taste for Pirated
Note: Frequency distribution of consumer taste for Pirated. About 6.5% of individuals’ tastes on Pirated are positive.
while larger standard deviations for piracy will drive more consumers to other
pirated movies of different titles. In my result, I find the second scenario to
be most likely true in reality. However, strong persistence of preference also
exists in Home, which to some extent helps, as more consumers may substitute
DVDs. For the WOM effect, the estimated coefficients on volume of WOM is
0.931 in the current full model, which means for a movie product with mean
WOM index of 150, an 10% increase in WOM leads to increase in utility by
0.038. The WOM coefficient is significant across all specifications, indicating
that controlling for observable variables, there is strong evidence that consumer
demand is influenced by WOM.
Law of Motion for WOM Using observations at the movie-week level, I es-
timate the law of motion to describe the evolution of WOM. Table 4.6 shows the
result for the law of motion of WOM. All coefficients are precisely estimated.
The coefficient on the lagged volume WOMmt−1 (ρ) is 0.423, suggesting that
WOM is persistent over time, but also decays at a rate of 0.425. The estimated
coefficient on the total views (κ) is 0.132, indicating that an increase in 1,000
views in contemporaneous total views increase the WOM index by 0.132. For
a movie with average WOM of 150, the index would double with an increase
of around 1.1 millions views.
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Table 4.6: Law of Motion of Word-of-mouth
WOMmt−1 0.4253∗∗∗
(ρ) (0.0072)
TotalViewsmt−1(in thousand) 0.1323∗∗∗
(κ) (0.0025)
Calendar Week FE X
Movie FE X
Observations 7983
Adjusted R2 0.7825
Note: Observations are at movie-time level. WOMmt is the volume of word-
of-mouth collected from Google Trends. TotalViewsmt−1 represent the sum of
LegalViewsmt−1 and IllegalViewsmt−1 . and Standard errors in parentheses, *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
4.5 Counterfactual Experiments
In this section, I simulate several counterfactual experiments to estimate the
true cost of file sharing on box office revenue. First, to examine the heteroge-
neous effects of piracy on different channel of sales, I conduct a “no-piracy”
experiment that eradicates all pirated movie products in my models and com-
pares the counterfactual box office and DVD revenue and consumer welfare
with the benchmark. Second, to examine the heterogeneous effect by piracy
quality, I remove high-quality and low-quality separately to examine the het-
erogeneous effects on industry revenue. Lastly, I shut down the WOM effect
channel to measure the magnitude of WOM effect of piracy on movie sales.
4.5.1 Full Removal: Heterogenous Effects by Distribution
Channels
I now turn to my primary research question: What is the cost of digital piracy
for the motion picture industry? How is the effect different by distribution
channels. To quantify the effect of piracy on the industry revenue, I simulate
a counterfactual experiment where I remove all pirated movies and recalculate
counterfactual market shares using the estimated full model parameters in col-
umn (2) of Table 4.5. This experiment can be treated as an anti-piracy campaign
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Table 4.7: Counterfactual Experiment: Removing All Piracy
(in $ billion) Current Remove All Piracy Change (%)
Box office Revenue 8.5278 8.7592 +0.2314 2.71%
DVD Revenue 1.4660 1.9934 +0.5274 35.98%
Consumer Welfare 30.1059 23.0533 -7.0506 -23.41%
Notes: This Panel report the result of industry revenue and consumer welfare after fully removal of all piracy products of all 40 weeks periods in United States. All first time period
observations’ last week views are not altered and I updated last week views for other periods considering the removal of piracy.
at the legislative level that bans piracy nationwide.
Updating Word-of-mouth Since the removal of piracy changes the illegal
views of all movies with piracy availability, legal views will also change, as
some pirated viewers switch to paid channels. The subsequent volume of
the WOM needs to be adjusted accordingly. The updating procedure is very
straightforward, I calculate counterfactual market shares sequentially, after coun-
terfactual market shares in period t are calculated. The volume of WOM for
movie m in period t + 1 can be calculated using its legal and illegal views in
period t and its volume in period t. I then use volume in period t+1 to calculate
the counterfactual market shares in t + 1.
Welfare Analysis Assuming price is the same after the no-piracy policy, I can
then calculate counterfactual industry revenue as the product of market share
times market size and price. Following Train (2009), consumer welfare at time
t is calculated as the market size times the average of expected maximum value
of indirect utility of simulated individuals:
CS t = M
1
|α|
1
nind
nind∑
i
E[maxui jt] (4.13)
where a is the mean price coefficient used to translate utility into terms of
money value, M denotes market size.
Result The result of the full removal counterfactual experiment is shown in
Table 4.7. As the result shows, the elimination of piracy has different results
on revenues from different channels.
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The home-video market is severely affected by piracy, as home-video sales
go up substantially by 35.98% after the removal of piracy. The total monetary
loss on the home-video sales sums up to 527 million dollars during the 40-
week period in the United States. The elimination of pirated movies results in
an increase in box office revenue of $231 million dollars, less than half of the
number in the home-video market. The figure represents a 2.71 % increase in
current total box office revenue, only a mild impact compared with the home-
video market.11
4.5.2 Partial Removal: Heterogenous Effects by Video Qual-
ity
Another interesting exercise is to examine the heterogeneous effect by piracy
video quality. As shown in the previous preliminary regressions, there is po-
tentially large degree of heterogeneity in quality across the two types of pirated
products. In terms of cannibalization, the two types of piracy might play dif-
ferent roles: high-quality piracy is a closer substitute to legitimate sales, but
low-quality piracy appears at an earlier time and interacts with ticket sales for
more time than high-quality piracy. Because of this timing, low-quality piracy
might be able to boost the box office more than high-quality piracy in terms of
the WOM effect.
To quantify and compare the effects on revenue, I run two sets of counter-
factuals. Specifically, I remove only high-quality piracy and low-quality piracy
in two separate counterfactuals and compare the response of the revenue to the
full eradication benchmark in the last section. I also run additional counter-
factuals that remove high/low-quality piracy but do not update the change in
11The counterfactual result on box office revenue is different from the result discussed in Chapter 3, where
removal of all piracy improves box office revenue by 1.09%. This discrepancy is mainly because the inclusion
of new data source results in different estimated substitution patterns. Two additional sources of variations might
help explain the observed discrepancy in couterfactuals. First, separating high-quality and low-quality piracy
provides more variations in the choice set, allowing distribution of consumer preference to be estimated more
precisely. Second, the inclusion of home-video sales provides an additional source of variations. A comparison
of the results indicates that these additional variations result in a larger estimate on the standard deviation of
random coefficient regarding movie titles in the results of Chapter 4. It generates more intra-movie substitution
and contributes to the higher recovered revenue in Chapter 4’s counterfactual experiment. To verify, I estimate a
similar version of the model in Chapter 4, excluding home-videos sales data. I find that the counterfactual results
with only quality data are very similar to the result in Table 4.7. So it is likely that additional variations on video
quality mainly contribute to the observed difference.
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WOM as a benchmark on pure cannibalization effects. A comparison between
pure cannibalization results and the full results will allow me to see the effects
of WOM. I also calculate the diversion ratio among channels. The diversion
ratio is calculated by examining how the share of the removed channels (high
quality/low quality) is allocated to different channels.
Table 4.8 presents the results on the industry revenue. There are several
interesting findings. Removing high-quality piracy results in a much higher
revenue increase than removing the low-quality piracy. Box office and DVD
revenue increase by 1.29% and 5.64% after removal of high quality piracy,
but the number is much smaller than the recovered revenue in the full removal
benchmark. As shown in Table 4.9, the reason is that 56.6% of the previ-
ous consumers choosing high-quality piracy now switch to low-quality piracy,
where, in the full removal, the low-quality option is not available, and many
choose a paid option instead. As low-quality piracy is removed, the affected
consumers almost exclusively switch to either high-quality piracy (54.4%) or
an outside option (43.8%), so the actual gain of revenue is very limited for both
box office and DVD.
When I allow WOM to update, another interesting result arises. While the
removal of low-quality piracy causes DVD sales to increase, the box office rev-
enue drops by 0.19%, compared to the previous result of a 0.03% growth. The
difference highlights the positive role of early low-quality piracy in spreading
of WOM, because of both its positive role in spreading WOM and the fact that
they are relatively imperfect substitutes for any paid channels. The positive
effect of WOM actually outweighs the limited negative cannibalization effects.
This indicates that low-quality piracy can be used as a promotional tools for
the studios. It’s possibly profitable to orchestrate piracy deliberately in order to
reap the free WOM generated by piracy12.
12It is still worth to note that, for more than half of all pirated movies, low-quality piracy acts as the second-best
option against the high-quality version. Despite the fact that removal of low-quality piracy brings no benefit, it is
still worth noting that the efficacy of removal of high-quality piracy will be severely affected if low-quality piracy
is not removed at the same time. As shown in Table 4.9, half of the high-quality users choose low-quality piracy
if it is available, but when low quality is removed altogether, half will eventually switch to paid channels.
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Table 4.8: Partial Removal by Video Quality
Box office Revenue DVD Revenue
Update WOM (in $ billions) (in $ billions)
Current - 8.5278 1.4660
(-) (-)
No 8.7269 1.9731
Remove (2.34%) (34.59%)
All Piracy Yes 8.7592 1.9935
(2.71%) (35.98%)
No 8.7221 1.5616
Remove (2.28%) (6.52%)
High-Quality Piracy Yes 8.6376 1.5486
(1.29%) (5.64%)
No 8.5307 1.4879
Remove (0.03%) (1.49%)
Low Quality Piracy Yes 8.5107 1.4744
-(0.19%) (0.57%)
Notes: This Table results of counterfactual experiment where I remove all piracy, remove only high quality (HQ) piracy or remove only Low quality piracy. For row 2,4,6 I shut
down the word-of-mouth updating process, so the results reflect pure substitution effects. In row 3,5,7, I sequentially update word-of-mouth and new market shares are calculated
using updated word-of-mouth, the difference in result between these two sets of experiments can be treated as the impact from word-of-mouth
Table 4.9: Diversion of Piracy Consumers by Destinations
Destination No change in word-of-mouth Update word-of-mouth
(divertion ratio) Remove All Remove HQ Remove LQ Remove All Remove HQ Remove LQ
Box office 15.8% 10.0% 1.8% 18.4% 17.7% -10.6%
DVD sale 25.8% 5.4% 3.1% 27.4% 4.8% 11.9%
Low-Quality Piracy - 56.6% - - 56.5% -
High-Quality Piracy - - 51.4% - - 51.3%
Outside Option 58.4% 28.0% 43.8% 54.3% 21.0% 47.4%
Notes: This Table shows consumer diversion ratio in the piracy removal experiment. The number are percentage of consumers that are diverted to certain option when
their first choice are eliminated.
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Table 4.10: Comparison of Counter-factual Revenue: With WOM vs No WOM
(in $ billions) Box office revenue DVD Revenue Consumer surplus
No WOM 8.5081 1.4367 30.0517
With WOM 8.5278 1.4660 30.1059
Contribution of WOM Effects from Piracy 0.0197 0.0490 0.0543
(percentage) (0.23%) (2.00%) (0.18%)
4.5.3 Positive Word-of-mouth Effect from Piracy
In the last counterfactual experiment, I quantify the magnitude of the WOM
effect from pirated consumption. In the model, demand is influenced by the
WOM. By generating more WOM, higher previous market share in a pirated
movie can therefore benefit the demand for paid movies in the next period.
Based on the estimates, the WOM effect is statistically significant. To directly
assess the magnitude of WOM effects, in this counterfactual experiment, I shut
down the WOM effect of piracy. Specifically I assume piracy no longer affect
evolution of WOM, this is done by cutting piracy views from total views, re-
calculate WOM and compare the counterfactual revenue with the benchmark
to quantify the magnitude of spillover effect on the industry revenue.
The results are shown in Table 4.10. The contribution from the spillover
effect on the industry revenue is relatively moderate. It increases the total box
office revenue by 19.7 million dollars for 40 weeks in the US, representing
0.23% of the total box office revenue. The small magnitude in benefits to the
box office may be attributed to the fast decay of movie attendance in theatres,
as most downloads take place late in a movie’s life cycle in theatres. Spillover
effects happen too late to affect sales, as movie availability in theatres drops
quickly. In terms of DVDs, the number increases compared to the box office,
amounting to roughly 2% of the total DVD revenue.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the heterogeneous effect of file sharing on movie box of-
fice and home-video sales revenue. To allow for flexible substitution patterns,
I estimate a random-coefficient demand model of movies, allowing demand to
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be influenced by spillover from pirated consumption. Using a representative
sample of download data from BitTorrent networks, I have several findings.
First, file sharing reduces the total revenue of the motion picture industry from
the box office by $ 231 million in total or 2.71% of the current box office in the
US for my sample of 40 weeks in 2015. Unlike the box office, in the home-
video market, DVD revenue increase by a surprising 36% when all piracy is
removed. Second, different qualities of piracy play different roles. The positive
WOM effects from low quality piracy outweigh its negative cannibalization
effects, while for high quality piracy, its cannibalization effect dominates. In-
terestingly, removal of high-quality piracy alone does not solve the problem, as
consumers that have a strong persistence for piracy will switch to low-quality
piracy instead. In the end, I examine the magnitude of the WOM effect of
piracy on box office revenue. I find that the WOM effect contributes to the box
office revenue by a total of 68.7 million dollars for a 40-week period.
The findings of this paper highlight the potential danger in over-generalization
in policy making regrading piracy. As the cannibalization effect of piracy varies
greatly by video quality and distribution channels, anti-piracy resource and ef-
forts should be directed towards the most harmful piracy type and the most
vulnerable markets. For industry, these results also have important manage-
rial implications. The proper estimate of the cannibalization and WOM effects
of piracy helps managers in the motion picture industry better assess potential
threats from piracy and design better strategies to harness the WOM effects of
piracy.
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Chapter 2 Appendices
A.1 Additional Test: Are Popular Movies Leaked
Earlier?
Even if leaks are not connected to time-invariant movie quality, still it is pos-
sible that leaks are driven by unobservable time-varying demand shocks such
as sudden increase in consumer interest or WOM, which will again introduce
endogeneity to my main empirical analysis. To test whether the decision to pi-
rate is the outcome of demand shocks, here I take advantage of Google Trends’
search volume data as a measure of consumer interests or popularity, which is
informative on unobservable demand shocks a movie is facing.
To be specific, I collect daily search volume of each leaked movie from
2010 to 2016, from 30 days prior to 30 days after the leak date. First, I calcu-
lated the mean daily search volume around this 2-month window, along with
the time interval between each movie’s screener release date and screener leak
date, a measure of how fast the screener leak happens. I then plot the title’s
mean daily search volume over the time from release to leak for each movie.
Figure A.1 indicates that the mean search volume of those leaked earlier is not
higher than those leaked later. To further substantiate our observation from the
figure, I regress mean daily search volume on the time from screener release
to leak. If movie pirates are influenced by demand factors, then we should
expect the sign on release-to-leak time to be significantly negative, as more
popular titles will have earlier leaks. The result from Table A.1 column (1)
shows that the coefficient of interest is close to zero and not statistically signif-
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Figure A.1: Mean Daily Search Volume by Time to Leaks
Notes: Search Volume data are collected from Google Trends. Titanic is chosen as the reference title, all titles’
search volume is normalized relative to those of Titanic. Plotted points represent mean daily search volume at
time of screener leak against the length of time from the release of screeners to reviewers to the leak.
Table A.1: Search Volume and Early Screener Leaks
(1) (2)
screener release to screener leaks -0.0031
(0.0141)
US release to screener leak -0.0085
(0.0096)
Observations 98 98
Adjusted R2 -0.0102 -0.0023
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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icant. In addition, I regress mean daily search volume on time between U.S.
release and screener leaks; the results are shown in column (2). This regression
specification addresses the possibility that better or more popular titles are well
protected so earlier leaks is harder a nd they enjoy longer “screener piracy-free”
windows as a result. The results in column (2) do not support this hypothesis
as again the coefficient of interest is close to zero and statistically insignificant.
In general, the results suggest that these leaks are not driven by demand.
Appendix B
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B.1 Preliminary Evidence
In this section I utilize the screener leaks incidence to provide some preliminary
evidence on the potential inter-movie substitution effect of piracy. I construct
a variable NumLeaksit which denotes the number of leaks incidence in specific
weeks. For example, if three movies are leaked at time t, then the NumLeaksit
is 3 for all observations during that week. To gauge the inter-movie substitution
effect, I restrict the sample to unleaked movies. The baseline specification is a
straightforward one:
ln(BoxO f f iceit) = αNumLeakit + Xitβ + λt + ξi + it (B.1)
where the dependent variable is the log of weekly box office revenue, one
the right hand side, Xit is a vector of time-varying control variables including
number of screens, weeks since release. λt is the time (week) fixed effects. ξi
denotes the movie fixed effects. it is the idiosyncratic error term.
Is the magnitude of inter-movie substitution effects affected by the degree
of substitutability between affected movie and leaked movie? To answer the
question, I explore different measures of NumLeaksit in addition to the base-
line model. I narrow the treatment to number of leaks that are of the same
genre and MPAA rating as movie i, as movies in the same genres and MPAA
ratings are generally considered as closer substitutes. Increased magnitude of
the estimated coefficient would suggest that inter-movie effects are stronger for
unleaked movies that are closer substitutes to the original leaked movie.
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Table B.1: Indirect Displacement Effects on Unleaked
(1) (2) (3)
All Leaks Same Genre Leaks Same MPAA Rating Leaks
Number of Leaks -0.030∗∗∗
(0.008)
Leaks under same genres -0.049∗
(0.021)
Leaks under same MPAA Rating -0.038∗∗
(0.014)
Weeks After Release -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of Screens 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Movie FE X X X
Calendar week FE X X X
Adjusted R2 0.609 0.609 0.609
Notes: The table provides estimates on the the effects of piracy on box office of other unleaked titles. Based on 78730 observations.
The dependent variable is the log of weekly box office of movie i. Column (1) reports the estimates using total number of new weekly
leaks as the treatment variable, column (2) re-defines the treatment variable as new weekly leaks under the same genre, column (3)
re-defines the treatment variable to new weekly leaks under the same MPAA rating. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The regression result of the baseline model is shown in Table B.1. From
the baseline result in column (1), an additional contemporaneous leaks will
reduce the same-week box office revenue of other unleaked movies by about
3%. The results suggest that the inter-movie substitution effects are significant.
Although the magnitude is relatively small compared to previous DD estimates,
the total cost in revenue might be higher given the large number of movies
screening together in theatres.
Columns (2) and (3) report results using leaks in the same genres and MPPA
ratings, as movies falling under the same genres or MPAA ratings can be treated
as closer substitutes. I find that an additional leak will reduce the box of-
fice revenue of unleaked movies in the same genre by 5%. In addition, an
additional leak will reduce the box office revenue of unleaked movies with the
same MPAA rating by 3.9%. The higher magnitude of the estimated coefficient
confirms that inter-movie effects are stronger for closer substitutes.
B.2. Substitution Patterns 99
B.2 Substitution Patterns
Table B.2 shows how consumers substitute into other products when their ini-
tial choice was eliminated for a selected number of movies in the United States
at one particular time period. An examination of Table B.2 reveals basic pat-
terns for intra-movie and inter-movie substitution effects. For example, after
the elimination of pirated versions of the movie Minions, 26 % of downloaders
of Minions chose to go to watch Minions in theatres. In addition, 4.5 % of
downloaders chose to watch another cartoon, Inside Out. In general, except
for blockbuster movies such as Avengers: Age of Ultron or Jurassic World that
have few concurrent competitors and lots of concurrent downloads during re-
lease, most movies can only reclaim a small fraction of recovered revenue given
full removal of piracy due to the timing of downloads and cross-substitution
into other piracy or paid movies.
B.3 Collection of File sharing Data
This section provides a description of the procedures of downloading on Bit-
Torrent and my data collection methodology.
It is very easy for BitTorrent users to download movie files online, they
only need to find the .torrent file associated to the requesting file, the .torrent
file is a descriptor meta-file containing important information to facilitate file
transfer. Each .torrent file is indexed by a unique 40-bit identifier called torrent
info-hash. The torrent file usually can be obtained from popular torrent search
engines such as Piratebay.com, Torrentz.com, and so on. Upon receiving the
.torrent file, the BitTorrent client software installed on a user’s computer will
help download the file automatically. The information on the .torrent file will
guide the client to contact BitTorrent trackers and get a list of clients (so called
“peers”) who are also downloading the same file. The role of trackers is essen-
tially directing the traffic in the Bit Torrent network. The tracker server does not
keep the file content itself, instead it keeps tracks of who are downloading the
file and informs the client who they should contact for file transfer. The tracker
server keeps the current number of downloads for each registered torrent file
and these numbers can be scraped by sending an HTTP or UDP request given
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the info-hash of torrent file1.
To obtain the estimates of weekly downloads on BitTorrent, I first collected
the torrent files of each movie by web crawling the popular BitTorrent search
engines. Every week the web crawler sent search queries about each movie on
major BitTorrent search engines (Torrentz, KickassTorrents, isoHunt, The Pi-
rate Bay, Extratorrent) and extracted the identifier (info-hash) of relevant movie
torrent files from the torrent information page.
To ensure the extracted torrent files were truly relevant, I added several
restrictions in the search queries:
• The file size has to be bigger than 200 MB.
• The file format has to be a video format such as mp4,avi,wmv,mkv,rmvb,etc.
• The file age cannot be older than the earliest release date of the movie2.
• I filter out several keywords such as: trailer, featurette, soundtrack, OST,
xxx, etc.
After obtaining a collection of info-hashes (torrent identifiers) for each
movie, I collected a list of all working public BitTorrent trackers. There are
currently 84 trackers in the list.
According to BitTorrent protocols, BitTorrent trackers will respond to HTTP
or UDP GET requests with information including number of downloads, cur-
rent number of seeders, number of leechers, and list of peers. The procedures
of obtaining downloads for a movie go as follows:
• For each movie (e.g. Furious 7), searches the name plus filter in torrent
search engine as shown in Figure 1.
• The webcrawler will collect the infohashes for all search results shown
in Figure 2.
1Though trackers coordinate most of the downloads on BitTorrent, it is not the only way to download files on
BitTorrent, downloading can happen in a decentralized way using DHT (Distributed Hash Table) without trackers
., I did not count download incidence in DHT for this study, because monitoring the DHT traffic is difficult. I am
working on estimating the scale of downloads in DHT for possible correction on the download estimates.
2One exception is DVDSCR format, as screener piracy prior release has been found very frequently.
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• Specifically, for each torrent file in search results, for example:
“Fast.and.Furious.7.HDRip.XviD.AC3-EVO”, the crawler will get ac-
cess to the Torrent information page and record the infohash as shown
in Figure 3:
35a89cb57246dbdfdbf581403c33010d177a30dd
• The computer program then transforms the infohash into codes that can
be understood by trackers (Bencode):
5%A8%9C%B5rF%DB%DF%DB%F5%81%40%3C3%01%0D%17z0%DD
• For each tracker in the tracker list (e.g. http://www.todotorrents.com:2710/announce),
the program sends a HTTP GET request3:
GET http:///www.todotorrents.com:2710/scrape?info_hash=5%A8
%9C%B5rF%DB%DF%DB%F5%81%40%3C3%01%0D%17z0%DD
• The tracker response contains information about the current number of
seeders (complete), leechers (incomplete) and the number of completed
downloads (downloaded) for the file:
{’files’: {’5\xa8\x9c\xb5rF\xdb\xdf\xdb\xf5\x81@<3\x01\r\
x17z0\xdd’: {’downloaded’: 659, ’complete’: 3, ’
incomplete’: 4}}}
From the response, ’downloaded’ indicates stock value of completed
downloads, ’complete’ refers to number of seeders, ’incomplete’ is the
number of leechers. The current number of downloads registered in this
tracker for this torrent is 659.
• The program records this number and repeats previous steps for all track-
ers and all torrents.
I aggregated the number of downloads of each torrent file to get the current
stock value of download count for each movie. Weekly flow value of down-
loads is obtained by taking the difference of download counts of consecutive
3The UDP request is similar so I omit the description of UDP.
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Figure B.1: Home Page of a Torrent Search En-
gine Figure B.2: Search Result
Figure B.3: Torrent Information Page
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weeks. This number can be treated as the total global downloads because the
trackers’ responses to SCRAPE requests contain no geographical information.
Additional HTTP and UDP ’announce’ requests were sent on a weekly basis
to trackers to get a snapshot list of IP address of users currently downloading
the files. I then used the IP address to identify the source country of download-
ers and the share of downloads from each country. Country-specific weekly
downloads were estimated using this geographic share information.
B.4 Reliability of the Download Estimates
Given the difficulty in estimating traffic on BitTorrent, concerns might be raised
regarding the precision of the data collected in this paper, as indeed certain
types of BitTorrent activities are omitted in my data collection procedures. For
example, the data collection process was unable to track download activity hap-
pening through the trackerless protocol (DHT) and private trackers. It would
be ideal to compare my data with more reliable statistics from sources such as
Internet surveillance companies to further assess the quality of my data. While
the data on downloading via BitTorrent for movies are scarce, I found yearly
download statistics for a limited number of movies in 2015 estimated by the
professional piracy tracking company Excipio. Table 12 shows the comparison
of the download estimates in this paper and Excipio’s estimates.
As the table shows, indeed there are some differences between the two
columns. Generally my data tend to underestimate the download compared
with Excipio’s, my average is 28,155,435 compared with their average: 33,221,557.
The correlation coefficient is 0.88. The high correlation suggested that varia-
tion in my data well matched the variation in the file-sharing network.
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Table B.3: Comparison between Download Estimates from Excipio and this
paper
Movie Title Excipio’s Estimates Estimates in this paper
Interstellar(2014) 46,762,310 37,615,912
Furious 7(2015) 44,794,877 37,961,921
Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015) 41,594,159 36,418,665
Mad Max: Fury Road (2015) 36,443,244 29,645,492
Terminator: Genisys (2015) 31,001,480 30,399,370
San Andreas (2015) 25,883,469 20,376,013
The Minions (2015) 23,495,140 22,071,636
Inside Out (2015) 22,734,070 22,135,244
Jurassic World (2015) 36,881,763 27,094,954
American Sniper (2014) 33,953,737 24,423,823
Fifty Shades of Grey (2015) 32,126,827 34,442,676
The Hobbit: Battle Of The Five Armys (2014) 31,574,872 24,179,608
Mean 33,211,557 28,155,435
Correlation Coefficient: 0.88
Notes: All download estimates number are up to Dec 31, 2015.
B.5 List of Trackers
udp://open.demonii.com:1337/announce
udp://9.rarbg.com:2710/announce
udp://tracker.leechers-paradise.org:6969/announce
udp://glotorrents.pw:6969/announce
http://bttracker.crunchbanglinux.org:6969/announce
http://i.bandito.org/announce
udp://www.eddie4.nl:6969/announce
udp://coppersurfer.tk:6969/announce
udp://shadowshq.eddie4.nl:6969/announce
http://tracker.dutchtracking.nl/announce
http://tracker.flashtorrents.org:6969/announce
udp://tracker.internetwarriors.net:1337/announce
http://www.todotorrents.com:2710/announce
http://pow7.com/announce
udp://inferno.demonoid.ph:3389/announce
http://torrent.gresille.org/announce
udp://tracker4.piratux.com:6969/announce
http://opensharing.org:2710/announce
http://anisaishuu.de:2710/announce
http://tracker.tvunderground.org.ru:3218/announce
http://tracker2.wasabii.com.tw:6969/announce
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udp://mgtracker.org:2710/announce
udp://shadowshq.yi.org:6969/announce
http://bt.careland.com.cn:6969/announce
http://teentorrent.com:7070/announce
http://tracker.dler.org:6969/announce
http://bigfoot1942.sektori.org:6969/announce
udp://sugoi.pomf.se:80/announce
http://tracker.blazing.de:6969/announce
udp://exodus.desync.com:6969/announce
udp://open.nyaatorrents.info:6544/announce
http://tracker.tricitytorrents.com:2710/announce
udp://tracker.blackunicorn.xyz:6969/announce
http://tracker.ex.ua/announce
udp://bt.rutor.org:2710/announce
http://announce.torrentsmd.com:6969/announce
http://tracker.aletorrenty.pl:2710/announce
http://210.244.71.11:6969/announce
udp://tracker.torrenty.org:6969/announce
http://pubt.net:2710/announce
http://tracker.best-torrents.net:6969/announce
http://tracker.files.fm:6969/announce
http://retracker.uln-ix.ru/announce
http://bulkpeers.com:2710/announce
http://tracker3.infohash.org/announce
http://bt.mp4ba.com:2710/announce
udp://tracker.opentrackr.org:1337/announce
udp://p4p.arenabg.ch:1337/announce
http://retracker.telecom.kz/announce
http://tracker.mg64.net:6881/announce
http://tracker.trackerfix.com/announce
udp://zer0day.ch:1337/announce
udp://tracker.piratepublic.com:1337/announce
udp://tracker.sktorrent.net:6969/announce
http://xbtrutor.com:2710/announce
http://85.17.19.180/announce
http://tracker.bittorrent.am/announce
http://siambit.org/announce.php
http://retracker.krs-ix.ru/announce
http://tracker.baravik.org:6970/announce
http://tracker.tntvillage.scambioetico.org:2710/announce
http://tracker.mininova.org/announce
http://tracker.frozen-layer.com:6969/announce
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http://www.mvgroup.org:2710/announce
http://bt.edwardk.info:6969/announce
http://share.camoe.cn:8080/announce
http://tracker.otaku-irc.fr/bt/announce.php
http://tracker.anirena.com:81/announce
http://tracker.dm258.cn:7070/announce
http://tracker.minglong.org:8080/announce
http://www.smartorrent.com:2710/announce
http://tracker.zaerc.com/announce.php
http://www.spanishtracker.com:2710/announce
http://www.todotorrents.com:2710/announce
http://www.tribalmixes.com/announce.php
http://funfile.org:2710/announce
http://mixfiend.com/announce.php
http://firesharing.altervista.org/announce.php
http://tracker.desitorrents.com:6969/announce
http://fafs.fansubanime.net/announce.php
http://all4nothin.net/announce.php
http://www.crnaberza.com/announce.php
http://www.gameupdates.org/announce.php
Zhuang Liu
Research Interests
Industrial Organization
Intellectual Property
Economics of Digitization
Applied Econometrics
Education
Ph.D. Economics, University of Western Ontario, Expected in 2019.
Dissertation Title: Essays in Industrial Organization.
Comittee: Prof. Salvador Navarro (Co-chair), Prof. David Rivers (Co-chair), Prof. Tai-Yeong Chung,
Prof. Roy Allen
M.A. Economics, Simon Fraser University, 2013.
B.A. Economics and Applied Psychology, Lanzhou University, 2012.
Working Papers
Quantifying the Heterogeneous Effects of Piracy on the Demand for Movies, 2019.
Will the Leak Sink the Ship? Screener Leaks and the Impact of Movie Piracy, 2018
Works in Progress
Government Subsidy and Productivity Dynamics in Chinese Steel Industry (with Salvador Navarro and
Jin Zhou), 2018
Effects of Digital Piracy on Sales, Entry and Welfare in Motion Picture Industry. 2018
Honors and Awards
Best PhD Student Paper Award, 1st Doctoral Workshop on the Economics of Digitization, 2017
Graduate Fellowship, University of Western Ontario, 2013-2017
Graduate Fellowship, Simon Fraser University, 2012-2013
First Class Scholarship, Lanzhou University, 2011
Zhuang Liu 2
Conference Presentations
“Quantifying the Heterogeneous Effects of Piracy on the Demand for Movies"
16th International Industrial Organization Conferences (Rising Star Session), Indianapolis, 2018
2017 China Meeting of the Econometric Society, Wuhan, China, 2017
2017 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, Hong Kong, China, 2017
1st Doctoral Workshop on the Economics of Digitization, Munich, Germany, 2017
Tenth IDEI-TSE-IAST Conference on The Economics of Intellectual Property, Software and the Inter-
net, Toulouse, France, 2017.
Western Economics 50th Anniversary Conference (Poster Session), London, Canada, 2016.
Canadian Economic Association 50th Annual Meetings, Ottawa, Canada, 2016.
UWO labor lunch seminar, London, Canada, 2015.
“Will the Leak sink the Ship? Screener Leaks and the Impact of Movie Piracy"
Canadian Economic Association 52th Annual Meetings, Montreal, Canada, 2018.
Research Experience
Research Assistant for Prof Salvador Navarro, 2017-2018
Research Assistant for Prof Mark Desjardine, 2016
Teaching Experience
Instructor, King’s University College, University of Western Ontario
International Finance (Evaluations: 6.1/7.0), Winter 2017
Instructor, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario
Intermediate Microeconomics II (Evaluations: 6.1/7.0), Summer 2017
Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario
Intermediate Microeconomics II, Public Finance, Econometrics II, Mathematical Economics, Interme-
diate Microeconomics, Mathematical Economics(Graduate), Principles of Macroeconomics, Principles
of Microeconomics
Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University
International Finance, Principles of Macroeconomics, Principles of Macroeconomics
Skills
Stata, Python, Fortran, SQL
SAS Certified Base Programmer
